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 The mortgage interest deduction and its impact on 
homeownership decisions 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the combined U.S. state and federal mortgage interest 
deduction (MID) on homeownership attainment, using data from 1984 to 2007 and exploiting 
variation in the subsidy arising from changes in the MID within and across states over time. We 
test whether capitalization of the MID into house prices offsets the positive effect on 
homeownership. We find that the MID boosts homeownership attainment only of higher income 
households in less tightly regulated housing markets. In more restrictive places an adverse effect 
exists. The MID is an ineffective policy to promote homeownership and improve social welfare. 
 
JEL classification: H22, H24, H71, R21, R31, R52 
Keywords: Homeownership, mortgage interest deduction, tax subsidies, land use regulation.
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1 Introduction 
One of the largest tax expenditures in the US, under federal law and some state law, is the 
mortgage interest deduction (hereafter, MID). It is justified as a means to broaden access to 
homeownership. There is some evidence, particularly from urban areas, that homeownership has 
important externalities. Hilber and Mayer (2009) find, however, that the positive externalities of 
homeownership may be confined to places with inelastic supply of housing. There is a large 
literature that suggests that in densely populated areas, homeownership is associated with lower 
crime rates, higher voting rates, more participation in collective action, etc.
1
 Much earlier work 
has investigated the impact of the MID on national homeownership rates, but to the best of our 
knowledge, no study to date has sorted out the extent to which the MID impacts may vary 
depending on local housing supply conditions. Since the externalities appear to depend on 
location, it is appropriate to consider how the benefits depend on location. This is the main 
objective of this paper. 
Using a measure of restrictions on new housing developed for 83 metro areas in the US 
(Saks 2008), we investigate how local housing market conditions and income status affect the 
way the MID influences household homeownership decisions. Our priors are that the impact of 
the MID may be positive or negative, depending on market conditions. The MID reduces the 
after-tax cost of homeownership for a given price of home. However, by increasing house prices, 
the MID increases the costs for downpayment-constrained households and, for all households, 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Dietz and Haurin (2003) for an overview. Hoff and Sen (2005) provide a theoretical rationale for why 
homeowner communities are associated with better civic environments: Households with identical preferences and 
abilities may segregate into communities by tenure and income due to credit market imperfections. Civic effort improves 
community quality, but is non-contractible. Only homeowners gain from the increase in property values, thus civic effort 
and its positive externalities are confined to owner-occupied neighborhoods in which civic effort is capitalized into house 
prices. A corollary, relevant for our analysis, is that in places with elastic supply and no capitalization, homeownership 
may not be positively associated with civic effort (see Hilber, 2010, for empirical evidence consistent with this 
corollary). 
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increases the opportunity costs of homeownership and the transaction costs of purchasing a 
home. Our empirical analysis suggests that the MID has no discernible impact on the level of US 
homeownership. However, the MID has a perverse effect in highly regulated housing markets. 
Because the supply of housing in such areas is inelastic, rather than boosting homeownership 
attainment, much of the MID is capitalized into housing prices. At the higher housing price, 
certain types of households (e.g., down payment constrained households) opt out of the market 
for owner occupied housing, yet full capitalization of the subsidy and utilization of the housing 
stock can occur if the remaining market segment increases housing consumption in response to 
the subsidy. Only in markets with lax land use regulation does the MID have a positive impact 
on homeownership attainment, and the positive effect of the MID occurs only for higher income 
households. Our cost simulations suggest that the subsidy cost per converted homeowner 
amounts to a staggering $28,397 per new homeowner per year. 
 These findings imply that there is a disconnect between the context in which a market 
failure exists and the context in which the MID can correct the market failure. The proposition 
that homeownership creates positive externalities, that the MID creates homeownership and 
therefore that the MID is a Pigouvian subsidy may be intuitive at first glance, but it is empirically 
false. It is false for a subtle reason. Where a positive externality from homeownership is likely to 
exist, in inelastically supplied housing markets, we find the MID acts as a tax on 
homeownership. The MID does increase homeownership attainment in elastically supplied 
housing markets, but in these places no positive externality from homeownership is likely to 
exist.   
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research. 
Section 3 examines the mechanisms by which the MID can affect incentives to own and presents 
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a stylized present value model to illustrate these mechanisms. Section 4 describes the measure 
we use to capture the MID tax subsidy to homeowners. Section 5 details the data and sample 
issues, outlines our empirical approach and identification strategy, presents our empirical 
findings, and discusses the quantitative significance and robustness of the findings. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Related research 
 While the exclusion of imputed rental income of owner-occupied housing from taxable 
compensation is the key tax benefit to homeowners (Poterba and Sinai, 2008), in the presence of 
asymmetric tax treatment of property owners (i.e. landlords versus owner-occupiers), the MID also 
represents a sizeable tax break to owner-occupied housing. According to the tax law of the U.S. and 
most U.S. states, landlords are taxed on their net rental income. The interest on their mortgages is 
not a personal expense but an expense necessary to earn the rental income. Owner-occupiers do not 
pay taxes on their imputed rental income, yet they can deduct mortgage interest from their taxable 
income. A voluminous literature recognizes the importance of taking into account federal tax policy 
when examining housing market outcomes (e.g., Rosen, 1979; Dynarski and Sheffrin, 1985; 
Poterba, 1992; Turner and Smith, 2009). Early efforts to determine the impacts of removing the 
preferential tax treatment of owner occupied housing on homeownership attainment include papers 
by Rosen (1979), Hendershott and Shilling (1982), Rosen et al. (1984) and Berkovec and Fullerton 
(1992) and, although the findings are not entirely conclusive, they suggest that the tenure choice 
impacts of removing the MID in isolation from other tax changes are likely to be small.  
Several studies highlight the need to consider housing supply elasticities when examining 
the housing market impacts of tax reform (Capozza et al., 1996; Green and Vandell, 1999). 
Capozza et al. (1996) maintain that the stock of prime residential land is inelastic, and thus 
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altering the current tax treatment of owner-occupied housing will have price rather than quantity 
effects. In an examination of rent-price ratios in 63 metropolitan areas, Capozza et al. conclude 
that eliminating the mortgage interest and property tax deduction would reduce house prices by 2 
to 13 percent depending on the metropolitan area. Using the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 
1990 Census, Green and Vandell (1999) examine the likelihood of homeownership, controlling 
for state fixed effects in an effort to adjust for differing supply elasticities across states and find 
that replacing the MID with a revenue neutral tax credit would actually boost the national 
homeownership rate by about 5 percentage points. More generally, the importance of the supply 
elasticity in determining equilibrium prices in local housing markets is highlighted in recent 
papers such as Glaeser et al. (2010) and Mayer (2011).  
Several papers document that the distribution of (primarily) federal housing tax benefits 
favors young and higher income homeowners and homeowners residing in regions with high 
incomes and high house prices (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003; Sinai and Gyourko, 2004; Poterba 
and Sinai, 2008). However, high income households also tend to be higher wealth households 
and therefore they are likely to use equity financing to purchase their homes in the absence of the 
mortgage interest deduction (Gervais and Pandey, 2008), thus further suggesting that the MID 
may have little impact on homeownership attainment.  
Two papers broach the subject of state mortgage subsidies. Consistent with Capozza et 
al.’s (1996) finding that the tax subsidies to homeowners primarily generate price effects, 
Bourassa and Min (2008) find that the combined state and federal mortgage interest deduction 
has an adverse effect on homeownership attainment of the young. In contrast, in an examination 
of state mortgage subsidies, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) report that state homeownership rates 
are unrelated to the size of state subsidies. Taken as a whole, existing research suggests that the 
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MID may not be a particularly effective policy tool for boosting homeownership attainment. 
However, to our knowledge, no study to date has sorted out the extent to which the MID impacts 
may vary depending on local housing supply conditions, a task we turn to next. 
 
3 Capitalization effects and homeownership 
3.1  Individual incentive and market-wide effects 
 There are two channels by which the MID may affect a homebuyer's incentive to own. 
First, a positive, direct homeownership incentive effect can occur because the MID reduces the 
after-tax interest costs for buyers that finance and itemize. This effect may increase the 
homebuyer's willingness to pay and thus market demand along both the extensive and intensive 
margins (i.e., the decision to own and the amount of housing consumed). Second, as long as 
supply of housing is not perfectly elastic, a homebuyer's incentives are also impacted by the 
indirect, market-wide effect of rising house prices occurring due to the aggregate behavior of 
market participants in response to the subsidy. Through this channel, the subsidy, indirectly via 
raising house prices, increases costs for down-payment constrained households, reduces the odds 
that severely constrained households can obtain a mortgage and also increases the transaction 
costs of buying a home.  
 Market adjustment is initiated by the direct incentive effect, by which the subsidy 
increases individual demand of households for owner-occupied housing, but is then driven by the 
resulting aggregate market demand and supply responses. Due to an increase in the demand, the 
quantity of owner-occupied housing may adjust along three margins: conversions of non-
residential property, conversion of rental stock to owner-occupied use and the quantity of land 
used for housing. The market-wide house price effect can be expected to be stronger in tightly 
regulated, inelastically supplied housing markets, wherein the MID can be expected to mainly 
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induce a reallocation of housing space across individuals since increasing the supply of owner-
occupied housing and conversion from rental to owner-occupied space are difficult. At one 
extreme, if the long run supply of owner-occupied housing in an area is perfectly elastic (i.e., 
land use controls are very lax and developable land is available in abundance) the equilibrium 
purchase price of housing can be expected to return to its pre-subsidy level. The subsidy in this 
case results in an expanded housing stock, an increased homeownership rate and zero house 
price capitalization at the new equilibrium. At the other extreme, if tight regulatory constraints in 
a locale make the supply of owner-occupied housing perfectly inelastic, the subsidy will be fully 
capitalized into the purchase price of owner-occupied housing, the owner-occupied housing 
stock will not expand, and the subsidy fails to increase the homeownership rate (in fact, it may 
reduce it, as we point out below). The capitalization of the subsidy into house prices represents a 
one-time windfall gain for existing homeowners. In elastically supplied markets no such windfall 
gain persists. 
  We speculate that the market-wide impacts of rising house prices may have adverse 
consequences for at least three types of households. First, households facing down payment 
constraints have three choices when house prices rise: (i) exit the market, (ii) purchase at a later 
date once more wealth is acquired to meet the higher down payment amount, or (iii) own, but, to 
do so, accept increased leverage as the house price increase is rolled into the loan amount. In the 
event of rigid loan-to-value requirements, the household may not have the option of accepting 
higher leverage and may instead be priced out of the market. Second, residents with relatively 
short expected durations in a given location may opt out of the owner-occupied market when 
house prices rise due to increasing transactions costs of owner-occupation. These transactions 
costs include realtor fees that are proportional to house values (Hsieh and Moretti, 2003), 
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financing costs and opportunity costs (Haurin and Gill, 2002). Third, homebuyers that are 
relatively risk averse may opt out of the local market for owner-occupied housing due to the 
subsidy-driven increase in house prices. By driving up house prices, an increase in the MID will 
require an increase in the amount of a household’s portfolio allocated to owner-occupied 
housing, an increase in the LTV or both. A shifting of more assets into owner-occupied housing 
to meet a higher down payment amount decreases portfolio diversification and therefore 
increases the household’s exposure to investment risk. Higher leverage similarly increases this 
risk. Greater exposure to investment risk all else equal is predicted to decrease the likelihood that 
households own (Turner, 2003; Hilber, 2005).  
In a setting with inelastic supply and heterogeneous households certain types of 
households such as those detailed above may opt out of the market for owner occupied housing 
as the asset price of housing rises, while other households remain in the market and boost 
housing consumption in response to the tax break induced by the MID. In a sense, those that are 
down-payment constrained, have a short expected duration, or are relatively risk-averse are bid 
out of the market. We thus speculate that, at the aggregate market level, the total physical 
quantity of owner-occupied housing may remain unchanged, yet the homeownership rate may 
fall because the subsidy results in an increase in housing demand on the intensive margin: those 
who remain in the market take up the slack by increasing housing consumption in response to the 
subsidy.  
3.2 Present value description 
 In this section, we examine in more detail the two channels by which the MID can affect 
homeownership incentives. To do so, first we use a simple net present value (NPV) model of the 
purchase price a homebuyer is willing to pay for a housing investment to illustrate the direct 
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incentive effect of the subsidy. Second, we refer to a theoretical model by Glaeser et al. (2010) to 
assess the relevance of market-wide equilibrium effects. Third, we consider the effect of the MID 
on the NPV of a housing investment by allowing the MID to be reflected both directly and 
indirectly in the NPV expression. We find that the overall effect of the MID on incentives to own 
is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the housing supply elasticity as well as other factors. 
When housing supply is perfectly elastic, the MID will always have a positive effect on 
incentives to own. However, when supply is not perfectly elastic, our simulations suggest there 
are realistic scenarios when the MID can have an adverse effect on the incentives to own. 
Asset market equilibrium requires that the price of a house equals the present value of its 
net service flows discounted at the individual's real after-tax interest rate (Poterba, 1984). Let P0 
be the purchase price of a unit house in the initial period. For a holding period of N years, the 
NPV of the housing investment is: 
 
     (      )  ∑ [
   (   (      )     (    )  )  
(   ) 
]     
(   )     
(   ) 
  (1) 
 
where αt represents the loan to value ratio, Pt is the house value, and Rt is the rental value of the 
housing services generated by the housing stock in period t. dt equals the depreciation and 
maintenance rate on the housing stock, rt equals the nominal mortgage interest rate, τt represents the 
marginal tax rate, and δt represents the property tax rate in period t. MSRt is the mortgage subsidy 
rate at time t. i is the real after-tax discount rate. φ is the transaction cost of selling the housing stock 
as a percent of the selling price, and LN is the remaining loan balance at the end of the holding 
period. The first term of equation (1) is the down payment amount. It is a cost incurred at the start of 
the holding period. The middle term is the net consumption value of the house (the rental value 
minus outlays), received in each year t, over the holding period. The third term is the net proceeds 
  9 
from the sale of the home at time N.
2
 
 Households may have different NPVs depending on their marginal tax rates, down payment 
constraints and their expected duration in the property; however, in equilibrium the marginal buyer's 
willingness to pay will equal the equilibrium price, which in turn equates to marginal cost. Glaeser 
et al. (2010) present a model of homeownership on the extensive margin with worker heterogeneity 
and variable housing supply elasticity (p. 17). While the objective of Glaeser et al. differs from ours, 
their model holds implications for the price effects of the mortgage subsidy rate (MSR) according to 
the supply elasticity, when the extensive margin is taken into account. This is the context of our 
NPV model (i.e., whether to purchase or not, whereby a condition for purchase is that the 
homebuyer's NPV of the home investment is greater than or equal to the market price). Utility 
maximization ensures that buyer valuation on the margin just equals the cost of buying at time t, 
and, by modeling the supply side directly, Glaser et al. derive an equilibrium price expression 
(equation 7, p. 17) that depends on a number of parameters, including the value of the MSR. To 
generate a semi-elasticity of house prices with respect to the MSR that is a function of the housing 
supply elasticity, we differentiate the log of the Glaeser et al. equilibrium price expression with 
respect to the MSR. In what follows, we combine the market-wide potential price effects implied by 
Glaeser et al. in their equation (7) with the basic NPV model above to generate some implications 
regarding the decision to buy that embody both the individual incentive and market-wide effects. 
 We differentiate equation (1) with respect to the MSR, allowing for the direct effect of 
the MSR, the homebuyer's tax break, and the indirect effect through market prices, ∂P0/∂MSR, 
which yields: 
 
                                                          
2
 For simplicity we ignore capital gains taxes in equation (1). Since the Tax Reform Act of 1997, only capital gains on 
owner-occupied housing in excess of $250K for single households ($500K for married couples filing jointly) are subject 
to the tax. See Shan (2011) for a recent discussion. 
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We assume that a one-time increase in the MSR will affect the purchase price, P0, not subsequent 
rates of house-price appreciation, πt. Now, consider the case of a perfectly elastic housing stock, 
which implies zero long-run house price capitalization. Setting ∂P0/∂MSR=0 eliminates all but 
the second term of equation (2), resulting in an unambiguously positive effect of the MSR on the 
NPV.
 
This positive effect is independent of the holding period and intuitively plausible: the MSR 
increases the homebuyer's incentive to own by providing a tax break without inducing higher 
equilibrium prices. In this context, the comparative static is positive, however, only for 
households that itemize deductions and such households tend to have a higher income. Thus 
equation (2) suggests that an increase in the subsidy will tend to increase the desirability of a 
house purchase for higher income households in elastic markets.
 
In the case of a less than perfectly elastic housing stock, some extent of market-wide 
house price capitalization is implied and ∂P0/∂MSR is positive. In this instance, equation (2) 
cannot be readily signed. As noted in section 3.1, we suspect that an adverse effect of a mortgage 
subsidy may arise for certain households, such as those that are down payment constrained. To 
examine whether this is so, we undertake the following thought experiment: What is the change 
in the NPV of a house purchase due to implementing a MSR at 26% (the mean MSR in our 
sample) when partial or full capitalization of the MSR into house prices occurs, households have 
a fixed amount – 20 percent of the pre-subsidy house price – available for a down payment and 
households vary in their expected duration in the property? To incorporate the supply elasticity 
and market-wide price effects, taking into account the extensive margin, we use the Glaeser et al. 
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parameter assumptions and their equation (7) to evaluate the semi-elasticity of prices with 
respect to the MSR and compute the resulting equilibrium price change under two different 
assumptions about the housing supply elasticity: a supply elasticity set equal to 2 and 0. We also 
consider the change in the NPV assuming equilibrium house prices rise by the present discounted 
value of the subsidy over a 20 year holding period. Note that even in the case of perfectly 
inelastic supply in the Glaeser et al. model, given the parameter values, the equilibrium price 
increase is smaller than the presented discounted value of the subsidy.
3
 An increase in price 
equal to the present discounted value of the subsidy reflects demand on both the extensive and 
intensive margins, whereas the model by Glaeser et al. is one of demand on the extensive margin 
only. 
The stylized story we are presenting is that the capitalization of the MSR into higher 
house prices is rolled into a larger loan amount post subsidy since the household has a fixed 
amount available for a down payment. While a potential homebuyer will ultimately benefit from 
the MSR-induced higher value of the home at the time of sale, all else equal, the potential buyer 
will also experience higher annual operating and financing costs as a result of the MSR-induced 
increase in house prices. The simulation of equation (2) under the various scenarios is presented 
in Appendix Table A1. Our simulations suggest that the MSR decreases the NPV of the housing 
investment for down-payment constrained potential homebuyers with short holding periods (up 
to 3 to 4 years) and under the assumption of inelastic supply (either assuming the price response 
implied by equation (7) of Glaeser et al. (2010) or assuming full capitalization). Our simulations 
suggest that a negative NPV is feasible even in the case of fairly (but not perfectly) elastic 
                                                          
3
 For example, assuming an initial purchase price of $200,000 and perfectly inelastic housing supply, as detailed in Table 
A1, using equation (7) and parameter values of Glaeser et al. (2010), we find the equilibrium price increase resulting 
from implementing a MSR of 26 percent equals $43,628. In contrast, the discounted present value of a subsidy equal to 
26 percent on a $200,000 house value over a 20 year holding period is $51,942.  
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supply, but only for an unrealistic holding period of one year. The simulation is suggestive of a 
potentially noticeable negative impact of the MSR on the probability of homeownership in metro 
areas with inelastic supply, particularly since most households in those places face down 
payment constraints and the median holding period in the United States is 6 years.
4
 While this is 
a stylized example, we think it is a plausible one for many potential homebuyers. It is not 
intended to prove that an adverse effect of the MSR exists in inelastically supplied markets, but 
that an adverse effect may exist. Next we empirically test for such an effect. 
3.3 Measures of housing supply elasticity 
There is ample evidence that indices of the restrictiveness of land use regulation are good 
proxies for the housing supply elasticity and thus for the potential for house price adjustment as a 
consequence of a demand shock or, conversely, expansion of owner-occupied housing through 
new construction. For example, Quigley and Raphael (2005) use a city-level index of regulatory 
stringency for California cities and relate this index to local house prices in 1990 and 2000. They 
document that more regulated cities have more expensive housing and a slower growth in 
housing stock. They confirm that these more regulated places also have a lower price elasticity of 
housing supply. In a similar vein, Saks (2008) demonstrates that locations with relatively few 
barriers to construction experience more residential construction and smaller increases in house 
prices in response to an increase in housing demand. Lutz (2009) examines the effect of a large 
exogenous shift in property tax burdens induced by a 1999 school finance reform in the state of 
New Hampshire. His estimates suggest that, in most of the state, municipalities with a reduced 
tax burden experienced a large increase in residential construction. In the area of the state near 
Boston, the region’s primary urban center, however, the shock cleared through price adjustment. 
                                                          
4
 Statistic is based on data from the National Association of Realtors (NAR) for the years 2001 to 2006 (statistic 
provided by Walter Molony, Analyst for the NAR, April 2007). 
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Lutz attributes these differing responses to differing housing supply elasticities, likely caused by 
spatial differences in regulatory restrictiveness. Finally, Saiz (2010) uses a current measure of 
regulatory restrictiveness – the Wharton regulatory index that captures the restrictiveness of 
regulation around 2005 – and relates this directly to measures of supply elasticity, demonstrating 
that more regulated metro areas have more inelastic supply.  
In the empirical analysis that follows we employ a measure of regulatory restrictiveness – 
compiled by Saks (2008) – as our proxy for the responsiveness of the owner-occupied housing 
stock to changes in house prices. Saks (2008) derives a ‘combined’ measure of regulatory 
restrictiveness for the late 1970s and the 1980s by using the simple average of six independent 
surveys conducted during this time period. The index is scaled to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. The index ranges from 2.21 for New York (most restrictive) to -2.40 for 
Bloomington-Normal, IL. Generally, desirable coastal metro areas such as New York, San 
Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles or Boston are most tightly regulated, whereas metro areas in 
the Midwest and the South tend to have lax land use controls. However, there is considerable 
within-state variation in the regulatory index. For example, while most metro areas in California 
are tightly regulated, the index ranges from +2.1 for San Francisco to -0.32 for Orange County. 
Similarly, while metro areas in Texas tend to have relatively lax regulation controlling the 
expansion of the housing stock, the index ranges from -1.18 for Dallas to +0.98 for Tyler. The 
most extreme difference can be found in the state of New York. Whereas, New York City tops 
the index table with +2.21, Buffalo-Niagara Falls is the second least tightly regulated place with 
an index of -1.96. See Saks (2008) and in particular her Table A2 for further details.  
Our regression analysis relies on the assumption that the ‘Saks index’ is exogenous to 
individual tenure decisions. This assumption seems plausible for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘Saks 
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index’ has the important advantage – compared to more recent measures of regulatory 
restrictiveness – that it essentially pre-dates our sample period and, hence, is exogenous to (not 
determined by) subsequent changes in tax policies and subsequent housing tenure decisions (and 
changes in homeownership rates) during the 1990s and 2000s.
5
 Secondly, the index captures 
regulatory restrictiveness at the MSA-level (not at the local level where planning boards are 
elected), and we control for MSA-level fixed effects that capture time-invariant unobservable 
MSA-level specific characteristics (e.g., the city-specific prospects for long-run future business 
investment) that may jointly determine past regulatory constraints and future individual tenure 
decisions. It is therefore plausible to assume that our measure of regulatory restrictiveness is 
uncorrelated with the error term. The ‘Saks index’ may also be preferable over geographical or 
physical constraints measures. Firstly, whereas tight regulatory constraints may always be 
binding and magnify price responses to demand shocks even if ample developable land is 
available, places with lax regulation and comparably little developable land may still have quite 
elastic supply. Various studies are indicative that geographical and physical constraints may be 
affecting price responses to demand shocks only in highly urbanized areas such as Boston or the 
Greater London Area (Lutz, 2009; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2012).
6
 Thirdly, in contrast to 
geographical constraints, regulatory constraints may also complicate or hinder the conversion of 
existing housing that is suitable for renter-occupation to housing that is more amenable for 
owner-occupation, thereby limiting the quantity supplied of owner-occupied housing.  
                                                          
5
 More recent measures of regulatory restrictiveness, such as the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index 
(WRLURI) from around 2005 (see Gyourko et al., 2008) have the drawback that the level of regulatory restrictiveness 
may be caused by changes in homeownership rates during our sample period, which may in turn be affected by changes 
in the MSR.  
6
 Saiz (2010) considers the impact of the presence of water bodies and slopes steeper than 15 degrees. While such 
constraints significantly restrict coastal areas and areas with major mountain chains, many metro areas are neither coastal 
nor located near major mountain chains yet they likely vary significantly in their supply elasticity. Saiz also computed a 
direct measure of supply elasticity but this is based in part on the – for our purposes – endogenous WRLURI index. 
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For these reasons we conduct our empirical analysis with the index measure generated by 
Saks (2008). In this context Saks’ finding that in more strictly regulated metro areas house prices 
respond more strongly to changes in housing demand is particularly reassuring, as it supports our 
implicit assumption that in more tightly regulated places (defined as in our study) the extent of 
capitalization of demand factors – e.g., the mortgage subsidy – is greater. In a further attempt to 
confirm our implicit assumption that house price capitalization effects are greater in more tightly 
regulated places, we conduct a simple test of the proposition that regulatory restrictiveness 
affects the extent to which the mortgage subsidy rate raises house prices within our sample. 
Table A2 in the Appendix reports the results of regressing the log of the house price index on the 
MSR (Panel A) and the house-price appreciation rate on the percentage change in the MSR 
(Panel B), respectively, controlling for year and MSA fixed effects as well as state and MSA 
time trends. Results are reported separately for highly regulated places (all metro areas with 
regulatory stringency of at least one standard deviation above the mean) and little regulated 
places (all metro areas with a regulatory stringency of at least one standard deviation below the 
mean).The results in both panels confirm that more regulated places have a much greater extent 
of capitalization of the MSR. The effect is between 4 and 12 times as large in the more regulated 
places and is statistically significant only in those places. While this is a preliminary and rather 
coarse look at capitalization, it is suggestive.  
It is also worth noting that other studies (e.g., Quigley and Raphael, 2005, for the US; 
Hilber and Vermeulen, 2012, for the UK) that use different measures to proxy for regulatory 
stringency also come to the same conclusion; house prices react more strongly to demand shocks 
(i.e., the extent of house price capitalization is greater) in more tightly regulated markets and 
hence, all else equal, housing is more expensive in those markets. Finally, in addition to the 
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regulatory control, the homeownership specifications we estimate control for housing stock 
composition in the Census tracts in which the households reside in order to capture at least in 
part the other aspect of housing supply elasticity: the extent to which the existing rental stock can 
be converted to owner-occupied use.  
 
4 Measuring the combined state and federal mortgage interest deduction 
 Our key variable of interest is the combined federal and state subsidy to homeowners 
through use of the federal and state (where applicable) mortgage interest deductions. While data 
reported in the PSID allows for the construction of each household’s mortgage interest paid, 
itemization status and an approximation of the marginal tax savings the household receives from 
claiming the MID, using the household’s actual marginal tax savings from the MID is not 
appropriate. The household’s actual mortgage subsidy rate is a complicated function of the 
household’s characteristics that also determine the likelihood of homeownership and would 
therefore be endogenous in a tenure choice model. Instead, we use a measure generated in the 
spirit of Cutler and Gruber (1996) that is correlated with the individual’s mortgage subsidy rate, 
but exogenous and not correlated with the other determinants of homeownership. This measure is 
the NBER average state and federal combined mortgage interest subsidy rate, which is publically 
available and generated by the NBER based on a large, fixed, nationally representative sample of 
1995 individual tax returns for each state and year, provided by the Statistics of Income Division 
of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.  
 The NBER measure is generated as follows (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993): State and 
federal income tax liabilities owed by a large sample of taxpayers in each state in each year are 
calculated, holding the sample and income distribution fixed. The mortgage interest is then 
increased by 1 percent for each taxpayer, the state and federal taxes are recalculated, and the 
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mortgage interest subsidy is generated as the ratio of the additional tax (savings) to the additional 
mortgage interest. The measure captures the tax savings from an additional dollar of mortgage 
interest, or, equivalently, it is the marginal subsidy rate on mortgage interest. The average MSR 
in a given state and year is then computed by averaging over taxpayers by state and year.  
 The NBER measure has a number of desirable features. First, it varies only due to 
changes in the federal and state tax laws, not due to changes in income or other household 
characteristics of the taxpayer sample. Second, using a large micro sample to generate a 
taxpayer-level subsidy measure and then averaging over all taxpayers by state and year captures 
the non-linearity and richness in the tax code that would not be captured by use of a more 
aggregated approach (such as running state median income through a tax calculator). Moreover, 
because the NBER MSR measure is the simple average of all taxpayers’ MSRs, we can derive 
the marginal effect of interest, the variation of the impact of the MSR by income status, without 
having an income-specific measure of the MSR: the marginal effects by income status 
controlling for the average MSR by income group and the marginal effects by income status 
controlling for the NBER MSR will be proportional (by a factor equal to the number of income 
categories).
7
 Third, using the average MSR in the state and year in which a household is 
observed provides an exogenous measure of the MSR for our household-level analysis. 
 There are two different effects of the MSR. First, there is the direct incentive effect of the 
subsidy for individuals. By use of aforementioned interaction terms, we can sort out the incentive 
effects by income group. Second, there is the indirect effect on house prices through the average 
market effect—essentially a reduced form effect. As presented in Section 5, we empirically 
                                                          
7
 To see this is so, consider a simplified example with two types of households: high income (D1=1) and low income 
(D2=1). Let X1 equal the MSR received by high income households and X2 equal the MSR received by low income 
households. Then the NBER MSR measure can be expressed as X=(X1 + X2)/2. A regression controlling for X1 and 
X2 (interacted with D1 and D2, respectively) will yield coefficient estimates that equal 2 times the corresponding 
estimates from controlling for X (interacted with D1 and D2). 
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distinguish the incentive versus market effects by controlling for supply conditions. The MSR 
controls are capturing the incentive effect, and the degree of regulatory restrictiveness interacted 
with the MSR captures the market price effect. In models that fail to control for the supply 
elasticity, the MSR effect would be a combination of the incentive and market effects. 
 The variation in the combined state and federal NBER measure across states and within 
states over time can result from changes in the federal tax code, the state tax code or both. The 
federal subsidy rate is affected by changes in the federal tax code that alter income definitions, 
itemization status and marginal tax rates in particular. During the time period we examine, there 
are five major instances of federal tax law changes. These occur in 1986, 1993, 1997, 2001 and 
2003. Reductions in marginal tax rates at the federal level may arise due to tax reform (TRA86) 
or fiscal stimulus (2001 and 2003 Bush era tax cuts), but in both instances reduce the value of the 
federal MID. In contrast, the 1993 and 1997 tax law changes increased marginal taxes rates, 
increasing the value of the federal MSR, but also put in places phase outs on some itemized 
deductions. Although states have a high degree of sovereignty in designing their tax codes, 
changes in the federal tax code may directly or indirectly trigger changes in state tax laws. For 
example, a change in federal marginal tax rates changes the value of deducting state taxes paid 
(income, sales, and property), which can affect the mix of tax instruments used at the state level.
8
 
Changes in federal tax structure can also directly impact the value of a state-level MID. For 
example, eight states have reciprocal deductibility: federal taxes are also deductible from state 
taxable income (Fisher, 2007), and therefore changes in federal taxes paid affect the state 
marginal tax rate faced by the taxpayer and hence the value of the state MSR. 
                                                          
8
 A strong consensus exists in the literature that the federal deductibility of state taxes (income, sales and property) 
causes states to rely more heavily on these sources of revenue than on non-federally-deductible taxes (e.g., Feldstein 
and Metcalf, 1987; Feenberg and Rosen, 1986; Metcalf , 2011; Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 1988). 
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 Some changes in the state MSR come about independently of changes in the federal tax 
code. States implement tax law changes when state fiscal crises arise or to mimic neighboring 
states’ policies (Howe and Reeb, 1997). A series of papers has examined the impact of tax 
competition between states on state tax law structure (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995). 
Heterogeneity in state tax structure also arises due to variation in states’ efforts to rely on taxes 
that allow an “exporting” of tax burdens to non-residents. This includes the aforementioned 
example of relying on tax sources that are deductible from federal taxable income. Other 
examples include the use of sales and business taxes that are expected to be shifted to residents 
of other states (Fisher, 2007). 
 In general, state income tax structures are not uniform across states and nor do they 
necessarily conform to the federal tax structure (Fisher, 2007, p. 414). Based on the variation in 
state tax structures and states' reactions to changes in federal tax structure, we expect that the 
variation in the MSR across and within states over time may be large. To determine if this is 
indeed the case, we examine a second NBER series, “the average net state mortgage interest 
subsidy by state and year,” which we refer to as the state MSR. A state's MSR gives the 
mortgage subsidy rate arising from the state income tax structure. This NBER series is 
constructed in the same manner as the combined mortgage interest subsidy, but is derived from 
the state income tax liabilities only of the fixed 1995 taxpayer sample. Table 1 reports summary 
statistics for both the state MSR and the combined MSR series in each state for the time period 
we analyze (1984-2007).  
 Referring to Table 1, notice that there is significant variation in the state MSR across U.S. 
states: the average subsidy rate in Oregon, for example, is 8.12 cents for every dollar of 
mortgage interest, whereas the average subsidy rate in Alabama is only 3.56 cents. Comparing 
  20 
the minimum to the maximum values in Table 1, we see that out of the 34 states that have a state 
MSR, over half have a state subsidy rate that changes by at least 2 percentage points over this 
time period, and, in some states, the change in the state MSR is sizeable: in Arizona, New York 
and Wisconsin the state MSR changes by 100% over the 24 year period under consideration. 
Finally, note that for the 16 states without a state MSR, the combined MSR nonetheless changes, 
reflecting the change in the federal MSR subsidy received by the taxpayers in these states at 
different points in time.
9
 
 How much of the variation shown in Table 1 is common across states and hence would 
be swept up by year fixed effects? Figure 1 shows the variation in the state MSR by state over 
time.
10
 No typical pattern emerges. The subsidy rises over time in some states and declines in 
others. Importantly, there is significant variation across states in the changes in the state MSR 
following instances of federal tax reform. For example, following TRA86, the state MSR rose in 
a number of states including Louisiana, Maryland, and Arkansas, but fell in others, such as 
Rhode Island and Minnesota.  
  
5 Empirical analysis 
5.1  Data and sample issues 
 This paper uses data from multiple sources. The primary data source is three decades of data 
from the ‘confidential version’ of the PSID, which is a longitudinal survey of families – from whom 
we (confidentially) know their Census tract of residence – that has been carried out continuously 
                                                          
9
 The following states are not represented in our PSID sample, but are included in Table 1 and Figure 1 for 
illustrative purposes: DE, IA, ME, MT, NE, NM, ND and VT.  
10
 All graphs are normalized to a bandwidth of 5 percentage points, except OK, which has a vertical range from 0 to 
7 percentage points. States not pictured do not have a state MSR during the time period considered, except CT. CT 
has a state MSR, but it is very small and graphically indistinguishable from zero if the regular bandwidth is applied. 
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since 1968 and provides a unique opportunity to follow households over time and across space.
11
 
We select all PSID households observed from 1984 to 2007. We begin the panel in 1984 because 
this is the first year in which the PSID collects information on the household wealth holdings. Data 
are collected annually until 1997 and biennially after 1997, providing up to 19 observations per 
household.
12
 The data include (i) the original 1968 PSID core sample of 5,000 households selected 
as a random cross-section sample of the U.S. population with an additional low-income sample, and 
(ii) persons living within a household unit that enter the sample as a separate household when they 
form their own household. The PSID reconstituted its sample in 1997 by dropping 1/3 of the core 
sample, changing to biennial data collection, and reformatting sample weights. Thus, our sample 
includes only those households observed from 1984 through 2007, roughly 2/3 of the original core 
sample. All of the household data used in this study are collected in each year of observation, except 
wealth data. Prior to 1997, the wealth data are collected every 5 years. After 1997, they are collected 
with each survey. For the pre-1997 wealth data, we apply a linear function to impute annual 
estimates of total net wealth.  
 In addition to the ‘confidential version’ of the PSID, we use four secondary data sources 
– all publicly available – that report data at the tract, metro area or state level. The NBER 
provides the mortgage subsidy rate, our key variable of interest discussed above, as well as a 
property tax subsidy rate (generated similarly). Our second source is the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA). From the FHFA we derive mortgage interest rate data as well as house 
                                                          
11
 The PSID tract and MSA location indicators are confidential data from the PSID GEOCODE data files and can be 
obtained from the PSID under special contract. These data are not available from the authors.  
12
 Due to missing data, we allow for an unbalanced panel in our analysis in order to include the greatest number of 
households. Our full regression sample underlying the specifications reported in Table 4 consists of 53,279 observations, 
which is roughly 67 percent of the fully balanced sample. 19 percent of households are observed every year, roughly 50 
percent are observed in at least 14 years and 15 percent are observed for 5 years or less. The sample underlying the 
regulatory interaction specifications reported in Table 5 are slightly more unbalanced. Due to missing values this sample 
consists of 29,621 observations, which is roughly 60 percent of the fully balanced sample. 
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price indexes.
 13
 Specifically, the FHFA provides data on metropolitan and state average 
effective mortgage interest rates at the time of mortgage origination for conventional, single-
family, non-farm loans. The data are from the FHFA’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey and are 
computed based on fully amortized loans. Refinances, non-amortized loans, and balloon loans 
are excluded from the FHFA data, as are non-conventional loans (www.fhfa.gov). We use metro 
area data whenever available and state level data for PSID households that are not residing in one 
of the FHFA reported metro areas. The effective mortgage interest rate is the contracted rate 
adjusted for fees and charges. We use the mortgage interest rate data as part of the user cost 
controls in a robustness check of our main specifications. The house price index and appreciation 
data, used in Table A2 as well as in specifications controlling for the relative cost of 
homeownership, also come from the FHFA. FHFA produces public use house price indexes at 
the metropolitan and state level using a repeat sales methodology and data on single-family 
properties whose loans have been purchased or securitized by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae over 
the years (see www.fhfa.gov). As with the FHFA interest rate data, we use the metro level 
indexes where available and the state level indexes for households that are not residing in one of 
the FHFA metro areas. The third source is the 1980 U.S. Census, which provides tract-level data 
on the composition of the housing stock. The specific variables we examine include the share of 
housing units in the tract that are single-family and the share of units that are in multiplexes 
(structures with 5 or more units). We use the 1980 composition of the housing stock as it will be 
exogenous in an analysis of the probability of homeownership post 1980. Finally, as noted in 
Section 3.3, we use the metropolitan-level regulatory index generated by Saks (2008) as a 
                                                          
13
 Until 2008, the most recent entity to generate the interest rate series was the Federal Housing Finance Board 
(FHFB). It was combined with OFHEO in 2008 to form the FHFA. 
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measure of the housing supply inelasticity. We link all these data to PSID households using 
PSID geographic location information. 
 The final sample includes 4,197 households corresponding to 53,279 household-year 
observations residing in metropolitan and non-metro areas for the base empirical specifications, 
and 2,620 households corresponding to 29,621 household-year observations residing in 
metropolitan areas for which we have Saks (2008) regulatory index data. Roughly 2.5 percent of 
households move to a different state and 4 percent of households move to a different MSA in any 
given year. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2007 dollars using the urban Consumer Price 
Index. All analysis is weighted using the PSID 2005 sample weights.
14
 
5.2 Empirical approach 
We estimate the following base specification for household i in location j at time t as a 
linear probability model: 
  0 1Pr ' ' 'ijt jt it jt i iown MSR X L D e          , (5) 
where MSR is the mortgage subsidy rate, which is expected to have a positive coefficient to the 
extent that it facilitates homeownership. The household’s MSR varies over time even if the 
household does not move at all or moves only within state. This is because the MSR varies 
within state over time. X is a vector of household characteristics that vary over time, L is a vector 
of time-invariant and time-varying location controls and D is a vector of individual fixed effects. 
The vector of time-varying household characteristics includes controls for total family income, 
total net wealth, age of head, marital status, children, and unemployment of head and spouse if 
present. We control for income by use of three income categories: low, moderate or high income. 
                                                          
14
 The PSID sample is not representative of the U.S. population without the application of sample weights. The post-
1997 weights are stratified to the U.S. population according to data from the Current Population Survey. See Heeringa 
and Connor (1999) for more discussion. We use the 2005 combined family weight because the more recent 2007 weight 
is preliminary and not available for as many households as the 2005 weight. 
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A low-income household is one whose annual income is less than or equal to 80 percent of state 
median income; moderate-income households include households with incomes between 80 and 
120 percent of state median income, and high-income households are those with incomes above 
120 percent of state median income.15 The vector of location characteristics includes tract-level 
housing composition controls (the share of housing units that are single family units and the 
share of housing units in multiplexes), MSA fixed effects and state fixed effects. The rationale 
for including both MSA- and state fixed effects is that not all households reside in MSAs. The 
state fixed effects provide location controls for those places. Also, there could be unobservable 
time-invariant effects at the MSA and state level. We also estimate equation (5) with MSA and 
state time trends to control for unobserved factors at the MSA and state level that may affect 
homeownership attainment and may be changing over time. We estimate (5) with a cluster 
correction to generate standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on two 
dimensions: households and ‘state   year’. We simultaneously cluster on these two dimensions 
to address the possibility that the errors may be serially correlated or spatially auto-correlated at 
the state level. While clustering on households deals with the serial correlation issue, clustering 
on ‘state   year’ addresses the possibility of spatial auto-correlation at the state level.16 We also 
run specifications that allow for a differential impact of tax subsidies depending on the 
household’s income by interacting MSR with income status. 
                                                          
15
 We use state median income data from the U.S. Census Bureau Table H-7, which provides annual median income 
estimates by state from 1984 to 2007, based on the Current Population Survey. Regarding the income classifications, 
note that state homeownership assistance programs, such as Florida's State Housing Initiatives Partnership Program 
(SHIP), the largest state housing trust fund, use these income definitions. For example, see 
http://www.floridahousing.org/Home/HousingPartners/LocalGovernments. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s HOME program, which supports homeownership, defines low income as 80 percent of MSA median 
income (http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/lawsandregs/index.cfm). 
16
 The reported standard errors are similar to those generated in specifications that use only a Huber-White sandwich 
estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity and those resulting from specifications that cluster only on households but not 
on ‘state  year’ groupings. Clustering by state is problematic in our empirical setup because households do move across 
states over time so the panels are not nested within state clusters (but they are nested within a given state and year). 
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One advantage of estimating equation (5) as a fixed effect model is that household fixed 
effects capture all unobserved heterogeneity in household characteristics – such as race/ethnicity 
of the household head – that are time invariant. To the extent that households don’t move, the 
fixed effects also capture time invariant location characteristics (at neighborhood-, municipality-, 
county-, state-, region-, and national-level). However, households do move across space and we 
observe such changes in our panel. As a result, we also include the location controls discussed 
above. Regarding total net wealth, note that changes in net asset wealth are driven in part by 
changes in income. Hence, once we control for fixed effects and household income, the impact 
of household net wealth on homeownership attainment can be expected to be quite limited.  
The use of state fixed effects in our empirical setup implies that we identify the effect of 
the MSR on the propensity to own off of variation in the MSR over time within states as well as 
across states. As noted above, the household’s MSR varies over time even if the household does 
not move at all or moves only within state. This is because the MSR varies within state over 
time. The household fixed effects allow us to also identify off of across state moves. Being able 
to use across state moves in addition to within state moves is arguably an added benefit of our 
approach, particularly since across state moves are often associated with substantive changes in 
the MSR. However, importantly, the household fixed effects do not preclude us from identifying 
off of within state moves or non-moves. In fact, most of the variation in the MSR of households 
is driven by within state changes of the MSR over time, which affect both within state movers 
and non-movers. Only roughly 3 percent of all changes in the MSR are driven by across state 
moves. We document the relevance of the two sources of variation (i.e. arising from changes in 
the MSR within state over time or arising from moves across states at different points in time) in 
the result-section below. 
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One concern with across state movers is that they may not be similar over time and across 
states and this may lead to a selection bias. In particular, households who move across states may 
be different from the rest of the population (i.e., non-movers and within-state movers), and it 
may be the characteristics of the across-state movers that explain our estimated effects rather 
than the subsidy rate itself. To address this concern, we check for whether or not our results are 
being driven by across state moves. To do this, we re-estimate our core specifications but 
additionally include ‘household   state’ fixed effects, in order to control for all state-specific 
unobserved characteristics of across state movers.
17
 Put differently, for each household we 
exploit only within state variation in the MSR, ignoring variation that arises from across state 
moves. 
To explore the impact of regulatory restrictiveness, we estimate the following 
specification for household i in location j at time t, again, as a linear probability model: 
  0 1 2 3Pr * ' ' 'ijt jt jt jt jt it jt i iown MSR MSR reg reg X L D e              , (6) 
where reg equals the value of the regulatory index – scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1 – with higher values of the index indicating greater regulatory restrictiveness and 
hence more inelastic housing supply. The theoretical considerations presented in Section 3 
suggest that α2 < 0: the positive impact of the subsidy on homeownership attainment ought to be 
weaker (and the negative impact stronger) in more regulated metro areas. Note that jtreg  varies 
in the panel even though our regulatory proxy is time-invariant and varies only by location. This 
is because jtreg  varies as households move between metro areas and thereby move from more to 
                                                          
17
 To see how we construct the household   state fixed effects, consider an example. Suppose a household resides in 
two states during our observation period: the household is observed living in CA and then moves to TX. We create 
two mutually exclusive indicator variables for this household: the first equals one in each year the household is in 
CA and zero otherwise. The other equals one in each year the household is in TX and zero otherwise. These fixed 
effects ensure that we only identify off of changes in the MSR that are not due to households moving across states. 
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less restrictive places and vice versa. We also run specifications where the regulatory index is 
interacted with the MSR and with the income status in order to investigate the extent to which 
different income groups are differentially affected by the mortgage subsidy rate in different 
regulatory environments. As with estimating equation (5), we estimate (6) simultaneously 
clustering on households and ‘state   year’. 
Missing from the analysis so far is a control for the relative cost of homeownership: the 
cost of housing services in the owner mode relative to the cost of housing services in the rental 
mode. In studies of homeownership, the annual cost of housing services in the owner mode is 
generally approximated as the user cost of housing, which is a household–specific variable 
measuring the expected consumption value of the housing services from purchasing a home. The 
user cost is the sum of depreciation and maintenance costs, the after-tax opportunity cost of the 
down payment, the after-tax mortgage interest payments and after-tax property tax payments 
minus the expected, nominal capital gain on the housing structure (Poterba, 1984). Of these 
components of user cost, equations (5) and (6) control for the MSR. As a robustness check, we 
also run the models in equation (6) adding controls for additional determinants of user cost: the 
FHFA reported effective mortgage interest rate, the NBER property tax subsidy rate and the 
FHFA contemporaneous house price appreciation rate as well as the price of rental housing, 
which we control for as the average annual rent in the city and year in which the family is 
observed.
18
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 The remaining terms in UC, depreciation and maintenance, are each typically set to a value of 0.02 (see e.g. Poterba, 
1992), and thus would be part of the constant in an estimation. For the rent data, we compute the average self-reported 
rent in the PSID in the city and year in which we observe the household. For households residing in non-metropolitan 
areas or metropolitan areas with a relatively small sample size (less than 100 PSID respondents), we compute a regional 
rent based on the metropolitan areas being located in one of the nine Census Divisions. 
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5.3  Results  
Table 2 presents population weighted summary statistics for the full sample and the 
regulatory restrictiveness sub-sample. Table 3 summarizes the sources of variation in the MSR. 
Table 3, Panel A, reports the distribution of moves by type (within state and across state) for the 
full regression sample according to 5 possibilities: no change in the MSR, a change in the MSR, 
and then by three different magnitudes of change in the MSR. Categories (1) and (2) in Table 3 
show that there are 50,216 household-year observations in the panel for which we observe data 
from one year to the next. Of these, 49,873 household-year observations experience a change in 
the MSR from the prior year and 343 do not. Among the 49,873 household-year observations 
that experience a change in the MSR since the previous year, the vast majority, 97 percent, are 
not across state moves. Category (1) shows that some moves occur both within and across states, 
even though the MSR is unchanged. Category (2) shows that we observe 9,161 household-year 
moves that are accompanied by a change in the MSR. Of these, 7,653 are within-state moves and 
1,508 are across-state moves. Note that among identified moves in category (2), 84 percent are 
within-state moves (this percentage may actually be a little higher since we cannot identify 
within Census tract moves).
19
 When we consider the distribution of moves by type for varying 
degrees of change in the MSR, we see that only for the most substantial changes in the MSR (5 
percent or higher) as shown in category (5), the across-state moves dominate the sample, but 
they are not the only source of variation. Of the 372 household-year observations which 
experience a change in the MSR greater than 5 percent from one year to the next, 55 percent are 
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 We use 1980 Census tract indicators and boundaries from the confidential PSID to identify whether households 
moved in any particular year or not. A household is identified as a mover-household if a change in the tract occurs. 
It is identified as an across-state mover if the state changes as well. We cannot categorize moves that occur within 
tract. While the PSID does have variables that indicate moves, these indicators are not consistent over the 1984 to 
2007 time period. Since all within Census tract moves are also within state moves, Table 3 may underrepresent the 
share of within state moves. It is important to emphasize that while Table 3 does not capture within Census tract 
moves, our empirical analysis does. We pick up every move for which there is a change in tenure status. That is, if a 
household changes tenure status within tract over time, we capture that move through a change in tenure status.  
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associated with across state moves, the remaining changes are either associated with within state 
moves (6 percent) or non-moves across tracts (39 percent). Households that elect not to move 
when the MSR changes also provide identification of the impact of the MSR on homeownership 
attainment. In fact, in principle non-movers can also change their housing tenure: renters can buy 
their rental property and homeowners can sell and lease back their homes. Panel B of Table 3 
documents the equivalent statistics for the regression sample with information on regulatory 
restrictiveness. Overall, Table 3 illustrates that the variation in the subsidy arises mainly from (i) 
within state changes in the MSR over time (affecting both within state movers and non-movers) 
and to a lesser extent from (ii) time-varying across state differences (affecting across state 
movers). 
Table 4 reports the results for the baseline estimations on the full PSID sample. Column 
(1) provides results for the specification that includes only the MSR, household controls, and 
household fixed effects. Column (2) then adds locations controls (the housing composition 
variables, MSA fixed effects and state fixed effects). Column (3) adds year fixed effects, column 
(4) adds state time trends and column (5) adds MSA time trends. Column (6) includes all these 
controls and allows for separate effects of the MSR by income group. Across all six 
specifications, the key variable of interest, the MSR, has no statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of homeownership, not even for the highest income households, in column (6), who 
tend to receive the greatest tax breaks from this feature of the tax code. This result is consistent 
with Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and suggests that, on aggregate, this very costly tax subsidy to 
U.S. homeowners has no discernible impact on the likelihood of homeownership attainment. 
The control variables all generate results that are sensible, intuitive and robust across all 
models. Income, wealth, age, being married and having children all positively impact the 
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likelihood of homeownership, with income and being married having particularly large impacts: 
based on the coefficients reported in column (5), high-income households are 13.8 percentage 
points more likely to own than low-income households; being married increases the likelihood of 
homeownership by 17.1 percentage points. An episode of head or spouse unemployment lowers 
the likelihood of homeownership by 4 and 3.2 percentage points, respectively. The location 
controls indicate that the composition of the housing stock matters for homeownership 
attainment: a greater fraction of single family units boosts homeownership attainment whereas a 
greater fraction of multiplexes lowers it. 
Table 5 addresses the central question of this paper: to what extent does the impact of the 
MID on the likelihood of homeownership vary by location? Specifically, we report results for 
specifications where the MSR is interacted with regulatory tightness and with income status. Our 
proposition, theoretically motivated in Section 3, is that in more regulated places (with inelastic 
supply), the tax subsidies get capitalized into house values rather than expand the (owner-
occupied) housing stock and thereby have little impact on homeownership attainment, or, may in 
fact have a negative impact, for example, because homeownership becomes comparably less 
attractive for down payment constrained households with short expected durations in their 
homes. Columns (1) to (3) allow for the impact of the MSR to vary by regulatory restrictiveness 
on the full sample for which we have regulatory data, with column (2) adding state time trends 
and column (3) also adding MSA time trends. Columns (4) and (5) further decompose the impact 
of the MSR on homeownership attainment by interacting the subsidy with regulatory 
restrictiveness and with income status. Column (4) adds state time trends to the standard 
controls; column (5) additionally adds MSA time trends. Columns (6) and (7) replicate the 
specifications reported in columns (3) and (5) except that columns (6) and (7) additionally 
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control for household   state fixed effects. The last two specifications allow us to test to what 
extent our results may be driven by across state movers who may be quite different from the rest 
of the population. The inclusion of household   state fixed effects controls for all state-specific 
unobserved characteristics of across state movers. Put differently, for each household we only 
exploit within state variation in the MSR, ignoring any variation that arises from across state 
moves. 
Columns (1) to (3) indicate that the MSR has no statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of owning if a household lives in a metro area with an average degree of regulatory 
restrictiveness. If a household lives in a place with relaxed land use controls (with a regulatory 
index below 0) the MSR will have a positive impact on homeownership attainment, whereas the 
effect is negative in more tightly constrained locations (with a regulatory index above 0), in line 
with our theoretical conjectures. According to column (3), evaluating the regulatory index at its 
sample mean of 0.191 suggests that the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
the MSR is negligible, increasing the homeownership rate by 0.03 percentage points. Evaluating 
the regulatory index at its extreme values of -2.4 (Bloomington-Normal, IL) and 2.21 (New 
York, NY) generates the following range: a one standard deviation increase in the MSR 
increases the likelihood of homeownership by 3.5 percentage points in the least regulated place 
and reduces the same by 2.7 percentage points in the most tightly regulated place. 
Referring to columns (4) and (5), we see that a further decomposition is insightful. It 
reveals that the impact of the subsidy on homeownership attainment by regulatory status varies 
considerably by income status. Our findings indicate that the subsidy has no effect on the 
likelihood that low-income households will attain homeownership, regardless of the regulatory 
status of the city in which they reside. We conjecture that this result is a combination of two 
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stylized facts: housing markets are segmented and very few low income households itemize.20 
Previous research indicates that housing markets tend to be segmented at the sub-metro level by 
house value (e.g., Case and Mayer, 1996). Low income households, which typically are non-
itemizers, tend to own lower valued houses and live in housing tracts with other lower income 
households (Belsky and Duda, 2002), suggesting that for middle or high income households, the 
low-income housing tracts may not be a substitute for the higher end housing in tightly regulated 
markets. To the extent that there is indeed no (or very little) substitutability between low income 
and higher income housing and the MSR generates little benefit for low-income homeowners, 
economic theory predicts that the MSR may not affect the demand for lower end housing and 
thus will have no effect on the price of lower end housing, independent of the supply price 
elasticity proxied by our regulatory constraint measure. Taking these considerations into account, 
our finding that the MSR has no effect on homeownership attainment of low income households 
appears to be quite plausible.  
The coefficients on the three-way interaction terms (income status   MSR   regulatory 
index) for moderate- and high-income households in columns (4) and (5) are statistically 
significant and meaningful. Consider column (5) that includes MSA time trends in addition to 
state time trends. Evaluating the regulatory index at its extreme values generates the following 
range for moderate-income households: a one standard deviation increase in the MSR increases 
the likelihood of homeownership attainment by 3.3 percentage points in the least regulated 
location and reduces it by 3.3 percentage points in the most tightly regulated place. For high-
income households, the impact of a one standard deviation increase in the MSR on the likelihood 
                                                          
20
 Even among low-income homeowners itemization rates are low. For example, using 2004 data from the Survey of 
Finances combined with NBER TAXSIM data, Poterba and Sinai (2008) report in their Table 2 that only 23 percent of 
low-income homeowners (those earning less than $40K in 2003) itemize whereas over 98 percent of high income 
homeowners do (those earning $125K or more). 
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of homeownership ranges from a 4.7 percentage point increase (least restrictive) to a reduction of 
3.0 percentage points (most restrictive).  
Columns (6) and (7) report the findings of our robustness check whereby we include 
‘household   state’ fixed effects to gauge to what extent our results may be driven by across 
state movers. The coefficients of the two specifications with ‘household   state’ fixed effects are 
qualitatively unchanged and quantitatively very similar to the corresponding specifications 
without the ‘household   state’ fixed effects, reported in the corresponding columns (3) and (5). 
These findings imply that our key findings are not driven by across state movers who may not be 
similar over time and across states.  
Regarding all the other results from Table 5, the household and location controls continue 
to be intuitive, plausible and robust across samples and specifications; the coefficient estimates 
are available from the authors upon request. Finally, as a robustness check, we re-estimate the 
specifications in Table 5 controlling for additional components of user cost: the NBER combined 
state and federal property tax subsidy rate, the FHFA effective mortgage rate, and the FHFA 
metropolitan house price appreciation rate as well as the price of rental housing. The results are 
reported in the Appendix Table A3. The additional controls have a negligible impact on our key 
findings. Of the controls, only the coefficient on rent is statistically significant across all 
specifications and suggests that a one standard deviation increase in local rents, holding the user 
cost of owner-occupied housing constant, increases the likelihood of homeownership by 1.7 to 
1.8 percentage points in all specifications. The property tax subsidy rate is marginally 
statistically significant only in column (7). The quantitative impact is relatively small: a one 
standard deviation increase in the property tax subsidy rate increases the propensity to own by 
1.9 percentage points. We should interpret these findings with some caution however as two of 
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the additional controls are subject to endogeneity concerns. The property tax rate is affected by 
house prices; places with greater housing wealth can set lower property tax rates, all else equal, 
and can still offer better local public services. At the same time an increase in the local 
homeownership rate may cause higher prices for owner-occupied housing. Hence, 
homeownership may affect property tax rates via house prices – reverse causation may be 
present. In a similar vein, if the homeownership rate increases, demand for mortgage credit 
strengthens as well. This in turn can raise mortgage interest rates. Again, reverse causation may 
be present. For all these reasons we report these results only as an Appendix Table (A2) rather 
than as our main specifications. 
5.4  Quantitative effects 
One way to gauge the cost of the MID is to compute the cost per net new homeowner 
created by the MID. To do so, we first determine the net number of households that are 
hypothetically moved into homeownership as a result of the mortgage interest subsidy. Using the 
specifications in Tables 4 and 5, we compute the probability of homeownership for each 
household with and without the mortgage subsidy. If in a given year the subsidy moves a 
household from a less than 50 percent likelihood of homeownership to a likelihood that exceeds 
50 percent, the household is counted as moving from renting to owning. If the household’s 
likelihood of homeownership decreases from above 50 percent to less than 50 percent as a result 
of the subsidy, this household is counted as moving from owning to renting. If the household 
does not experience a change in the likelihood of homeownership that crosses the 50 percent 
threshold, the household is counted as not having experienced a change in its tenure status. 
We then compute the fraction of the sample that falls into each category: moving from 
renting to owning, moving from owning to renting, or having no change in tenure status. The net 
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impact is computed as the percent of the sample moved into homeownership minus the percent 
of the sample moved out of homeownership, as defined above, as a result of the MID. Table 6, 
Panel A, reports these results by specification. Notice that for the U.S. on average, based on the 
econometric results in Table 4, this exercise suggests a net negative impact of the MID on the 
likelihood of homeownership (although the effects are all not statistically significant), whereas 
all but one specification reported in Table 5 imply a relatively small positive (and statistically 
significant) impact. (The specification in column (6) of Table 5 implies a very small but 
statistically significant negative net effect.) Our core specification reported in column (5) of 
Table 5, which allows the impact of the MID to vary by regulatory restrictiveness and by income 
status , results in a net positive gain in the number of homeowners by 3.2 percent, and this is the 
estimate we proceed with to compute the subsidy cost per net additional homeowner. 
There are an estimated 115 million households in the US in 2010 (the most recent Census 
Bureau estimate available).
21
 Hence, specification (5) in Table 5 implies that the subsidy in any 
given year generates 3.68 million new homeowners in the United States (3.2 percent times 115 
million). At an estimated total cost of 104.5 billion in 2011 (Office of Management and Budget, 
2010), the subsidy per converted homeowner thus amounts to a staggering $28,397 per year.
22
 
The (non-significant) coefficients on the MID-variable reported in the various specifications in 
Table 4 – if taken at face value – all imply that the tax payer may spend 104.5 billion in 2011 
with the overall net effect being that fewer households own, as a consequence of the MID.  
                                                          
21
 See www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hh-fam/table1n.txt. 
22
 The costs are substantially higher according to the results reported in column (7) of Table 5, which allows the 
impact of the MID to vary by regulatory restrictiveness and by income status, net of the influence of across state 
movers. This specification implies a net positive gain in the number of homeowners of 0.7 percent, suggesting that 
to move one renter household into homeownership through the MID costs US taxpayers $129,814 in foregone tax 
revenue annually. 
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Table 6, Panel B, documents the implied average change in the propensity to own for 
low, moderate and high income households as a consequence of the implementation of an MID 
of 26 percent – the sample average. Results are reported separately for tightly and loosely 
regulated places (corresponding to the categorization in Table A2). Whereas in these polar cases 
the effects of the MID on the propensity to own are never statistically significant for low income 
households, the effects for moderate and high income households are not only statistically 
significant but also quantitatively meaningful: In the most tightly regulated places the 
introduction of the MID reduces the propensity to own, depending on the specification and 
income category (moderate or high), by between 18 and 28 percent. In the least regulated places 
the propensity to own increases by between 13 and 28 percent. 
5.5  Additional robustness checks 
In this section we report the findings of some additional robustness checks. We first 
consider whether the results of our key specification are sensitive to the inclusion of our 1980 
tract-level housing composition controls. We include these controls to capture the ease with 
which rental housing stock may be converted to owner-occupied housing at the local level. Using 
these controls for a time period that pre-dates our sample period should alleviate concerns that 
these measures are endogenous to the MSR, nevertheless, as a robustness check, we re-estimate 
our core specification, model (5) of Table 5, without these controls, to see whether our results are 
robust to excluding them. The results of the check are reported in column (1) of Appendix Table 
A4. The coefficient estimates on our key three-way interaction variables change little. The MSR 
coefficient estimate for high income households by regulatory restrictiveness increases slightly 
and remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The MSR coefficient estimate for 
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moderate income households by regulatory status decreases somewhat in magnitude and is 
borderline insignificant.  
Next, we examine our three-way interaction effects by income groups more closely. In 
our base specifications we use standard income classifications, which have the advantage that 
they are commonly used in academic and policy debates. However, this comes at the cost: we do 
not fully exploit the rich income variation that the PSID provides. Hence, we re-estimate our 
core specification but we use four or even five income categories instead of only three, both with 
and without housing composition controls. Specifically, we sub-divide the high income group 
into two and three categories, respectively. Summary statistics for the additional income 
categories are reported at the bottom of Table 2. The results, reported in columns (2) to (5) of 
Appendix Table A4 are comparable with the findings from our core specification with only three 
income groups, both in terms of statistical significance levels and marginal effects. Interestingly, 
the negative three-way interaction effect between the MSR and regulatory restrictiveness is 
consistently strongest for the second highest income group (1.2 to 2 times the state median 
income in columns (2) and (3) and 1.6 to 2 times the state median income in columns (4) and 
(5)). This finding suggests an inverted U-shaped adverse effect of the MSR in regulated places 
by income. Looking at the most adversely affected income group and based on the results 
reported in column (2), a one standard deviation increase in the MSR increases the likelihood of 
homeownership attainment by 4.7 percentage points in the least regulated location and reduces it 
by 3.5 percentage points in the most tightly regulated place. In column (4) the respective effects 
are between a 4.9 percentage point increase (least restrictive) and a reduction of 2.6 percentage 
points (most restrictive).  
  38 
Finally, we compare the findings of our core analysis with the results from an aggregate 
MSA-level analysis. Our household level (core) analysis allows us to carefully identify the effect 
of the MSR on individual tenure decisions, depending on income status and supply conditions 
and controlling for numerous time-invariant and time-varying characteristics. We two-way 
cluster on households and state   year in the household-level analysis, accounting for household 
correlations. An MSA-level analysis allows for an alternative manner to account for household 
(within MSA) correlations, and provides a useful robustness check. Moreover, our key variable 
of interest, the MID, varies at the MSA level, thus it is sensible to consider a specification that 
aggregates the other variables to the MSA level. We therefore use our household data to 
aggregate up, for each PSID year, to the MSA-level, dropping MSAs that cross state borders. 
Summary statistics of the resulting MSA-level panel are reported in Appendix Table A5. Our 
dependent variable is now the homeownership rate of MSA j in year t and we explore whether 
this rate is differentially affected by the state-specific MSR. We again estimate various three-way 
interaction effects but instead of using the income category dummies we use the proportion of 
households in an MSA that belong to each income group.  
The findings of the MSA-level analysis are reported in Appendix Table A6. Overall, the 
results are comparable to those of our core analysis: the MID has a positive effect on the 
proportion of homeowners in elastically supplied markets and a negative effect in inelastically 
supplied markets. Referring to column (2) of Table A6, a one standard deviation increase in the 
MSR increases the MSA-level homeownership rate by 4.0 percentage points in the least 
regulated MSA and reduces it by 1.8 percentage points in the most regulated MSA. Since more 
people live in the more regulated MSAs than in the less regulated ones (for example, the average 
population size in 2000 of the 10% most regulated MSAs in our sample is 2.62 million , whereas 
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the average size of the 10% least regulated MSAs is 0.57 million ), these results are consistent 
with the overall negligible impact of the MID on homeownership attainment that we find in 
Table 4. The specifications with three-way interactions (income status   MSR  regulatory 
index) provide additional insights. Consider, for example, the results reported in column (4) of 
Appendix Table A6. If we compare the most and the least regulated MSAs and assume that they 
have the income distribution of the sample mean, then the implied effects of a one standard 
deviation increase in the MSR on homeownership attainment are +3.9% and -1.5%, respectively. 
In the instance of an income distribution that is somewhat skewed towards higher income 
households, the MID effects are stronger by regulatory status. For example, suppose the share of 
high and moderate income households are each five points above the MSA sample mean, and the 
share of low income households is 10 points lower than the sample mean. The implied effects of 
a one standard deviation increase in the MSR on homeownership attainment are then +5.5% and 
-3% in elastically and inelastically supplied places, respectively. If the income distribution is 
skewed towards lower income households, the implied positive and negative effects become 
negligible. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 This paper provides a first look at the impact of the combined state and federal mortgage 
interest tax subsidy on homeownership attainment taking into account housing supply conditions 
via a measure of regulatory restrictiveness in local housing markets. We find that the MID has no 
statistically significant impact on homeownership attainment in aggregate. However, the MID 
does have an impact on individual homeownership decisions – both positive and negative – 
depending on the restrictiveness of land use regulations at the place of residence and the income 
status of the household: In places with more elastic housing supply, the MID has a positive effect 
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on homeownership attainment, but only for higher income groups. In more restrictive places, the 
mortgage tax subsidy has a significant adverse impact, again only for higher income groups. The 
MID has no impact on the homeownership attainment of low-income households, regardless of 
regulatory status. We speculate that this is because the housing market within a city tends to be 
segmented by income and the MID provides a tax subsidy only to the relatively higher income 
households that itemize. Consequently, we expect that lower income housing will generally not 
experience house price changes due to changes in the subsidy.  
One argument in favor of the MID is that it increases homeownership attainment and, as a 
result, creates positive externalities. Recent research has highlighted that the positive 
externalities associated with homeownership may help improve local communities confronted 
with underperforming public schools, lack of social capital and poor governance (Hoff and Sen, 
2005; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Hilber and Mayer, 2009; Fischel, 2001). However, these 
positive externalities are likely confined to – typically highly urbanized – places with inelastic 
housing supply, wherein civic engagement and investments into local public goods are 
capitalized into local house prices. Our research suggests that the MID decreases rather than 
increases homeownership attainment in these places. In places with lax land use controls, the 
MID has a positive impact on homeownership attainment, yet, in these elastically supplied – 
typically less urbanized – places, homeownership may generate few or no positive externalities 
(Hilber and Mayer, 2009; Hilber, 2010). Thus, a central implication of our paper is that there is a 
disconnect between the places in which positive externalities of homeownership exist and the 
places in which the MID is able to generate increases in homeownership. We conclude that the 
MID is a costly and ineffective policy for boosting homeownership and social welfare. 
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To fully understand the efficiency (and distributional) impacts of the MID, future work 
might examine its impact on the “over-consumption” of owner-occupied housing by income and 
regulatory status. This paper examines only a portion of the total subsidy to homeowners. We did 
not examine the effect of other subsidies to homeowners: imputed rent is untaxed, capital gains 
are untaxed for most households and property taxes are tax deductible. Another area for future 
research is to explore the extent to which these other tax subsidies to homeowners also generate 
unintended consequences, particularly, in more inelastically supplied housing markets.  
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
NBER Mortgage Subsidy Rate by U.S. State in %, 1984-2007 (PSID Sample Years Only) 
 
U.S. State Av. state net MSR Std. Dev. Min. Max. Av. comb. MSR Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
ALABAMA  3.56 0.12 3.29 3.72 25.19 2.10 22.8 29.37 
ALASKA  0 0 0 0 26.92 3.10 23.21 33.3 
ARIZONA  4.21 0.86 3.37 5.61 26.14 2.11 23.19 30.51 
ARKANSAS  5.46 0.83 3.81 6.43 28.26 1.62 25.95 31.22 
CALIFORNIA  6.01 0.32 5.43 6.54 26.67 1.41 24.94 29.48 
COLORADO  4.71 0.27 4.44 5.28 27.08 2.07 24.55 31.48 
CONNECTICUT  0.06 0.07 0 0.22 25.60 2.45 22.89 30.55 
DELAWARE  6.41 0.87 5.1 8.56 27.37 2.21 24.06 31.95 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  8.98 0.56 7.94 10.17 34.68 2.60 32.36 40.48 
FLORIDA  0 0 0 0 22.97 2.14 20.15 27.22 
GEORGIA  5.32 0.11 5.21 5.56 27.78 2.26 25.32 32.68 
HAWAII  8.86 0.67 7.57 9.46 28.20 1.75 25.31 31.83 
IDAHO  5.74 0.37 4.96 6.56 25.81 2.22 22.76 29.71 
ILLINOIS  0 0 0 0 24.50 2.37 21.73 29.48 
INDIANA  0 0 0 0 23.62 2.35 20.26 28.11 
IOWA  5.59 0.21 5.25 5.81 27.63 2.03 25.1 31.93 
KANSAS  5.33 0.84 3.07 6.19 28.83 2.33 25.85 33.66 
KENTUCKY  5.26 0.72 3.96 5.83 27.80 1.93 25.63 31.4 
LOUISIANA  2.23 1.37 -1.45 3.08 26.78 2.71 21.74 31.23 
MAINE  7.28 0.36 6.31 7.78 28.13 1.79 25.98 31.53 
MARYLAND  3.89 1.70 0.06 4.69 26.49 0.97 24.56 28.08 
MASSACHUSETTS  0 0 0 0 24.18 2.12 21.65 28.74 
MICHIGAN  0 0 0 0 25.03 2.42 21.93 29.94 
MINNESOTA  7.05 1.08 5.34 9.59 29.40 3.36 25.05 37.39 
MISSISSIPPI  4.04 0.31 3.47 4.53 27.80 1.67 25.22 31.08 
MISSOURI  4.19 0.53 3.38 4.93 27.26 1.84 24.95 30.58 
MONTANA  5.25 0.86 3.56 6.19 26.12 1.93 24.13 29.59 
NEBRASKA  5.02 0.52 4.17 6.3 27.05 1.82 25.09 30.79 
NEVADA  0 0 0 0 24.23 1.90 21.77 28.11 
NEW HAMPSHIRE  0 0 0 0 23.00 2.08 20.49 27.46 
NEW JERSEY 0 0 0 0 24.70 2.29 22.2 29.68 
NEW MEXICO  5.29 0.80 3.69 6.22 26.88 1.30 24.15 28.9 
NEW YORK  5.73 1.21 4.44 8.49 28.26 2.60 25.88 34.23 
NORTH CAROLINA  6.27 0.53 5.52 7.05 28.49 1.78 26.53 31.81 
NORTH DAKOTA  3.28 0.17 3.08 3.58 27.51 2.61 24.89 33.36 
OHIO  0 0 0 0 24.23 2.31 21.35 28.9 
OKLAHOMA  4.56 2.44 0.4 6.41 26.70 2.09 24.72 30.79 
OREGON  8.12 0.51 6.7 8.86 28.97 2.11 26.45 33.64 
PENNSYLVANIA  0 0 0 0 24.03 2.26 21.25 28.56 
RHODE ISLAND  5.22 0.50 4.31 6.07 26.10 2.46 23.37 31.69 
SOUTH CAROLINA  5.90 0.44 5.3 6.52 27.29 2.14 24.23 31.84 
SOUTH DAKOTA  0 0 0 0 22.86 2.11 20.52 27.59 
TENNESSEE  0 0 0 0 24.50 2.42 20.96 29.25 
TEXAS  0 0 0 0 25.55 2.68 22.26 30.83 
UTAH  6.07 0.41 5.41 7.34 25.70 1.62 23.73 29.13 
VERMONT  5.72 0.70 4.4 6.76 27.48 2.67 24.07 33.25 
VIRGINIA  5.29 0.12 5.15 5.49 27.99 1.89 25.82 32.04 
WASHINGTON  0 0 0 0 22.12 1.88 19.37 25.8 
WEST VIRGINIA  0.87 2.06 0 5.6 23.00 2.77 19.66 28.89 
WISCONSIN  4.84 0.79 3.73 7.15 27.56 2.30 24.98 32.96 
WYOMING  0 0 0 0 21.77 3.20 18.71 28.58 
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TABLE 2 
Population Weighted Summary Statistics: PSID Households 1984 to 2007 
 
Full regression sample 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Owner-occupier = yes 53279 0.716 0.451 0 1 
Mortgage subsidy rate (absolute) 53279 0.260 0.0284 0.187 0.405 
Household income in 2007 US-$10,000 53279 8.29 10.20 0 583.91 
Household has low income (  80% state median) 53279 0.234 0.423 0 1 
 moderate income  53279 0.190 0.392 0 1 
 high income (  120% state median) 53279 0.576 0.494 0 1 
Age of household head 53279 45.10 13.51 0 97 
Married 53279 0.643 0.479 0 1 
One child 53279 0.176 0.380 0 1 
Two children 53279 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Three or more children 53279 0.0917 0.289 0 1 
Head in labor force and unemployed last year 53279 0.0802 0.272 0 1 
Wife in labor force and unemployed last year 53279 0.0317 0.175 0 1 
Share units in tract that are single family 53279 0.648 0.243 0 1 
Share units in tract in apartment b. (5+ units) 53279 0.155 0.191 0 1 
Total net wealth in 2007 US-$1 million 53279 0.331 1.21 -1.30 50.48 
Year of observation 53279 1994.3 6.88 1984 2007 
Sample of observations with MSA-level information on regulatory restrictiveness 
Owner-occupier = yes 29621 0.694 0.461 0 1 
Mortgage subsidy rate (absolute) 29621 0.261 0.0293 0.194 0.405 
Household income in 2007 US-$10,000 29621 9.06 11.26 0 583.91 
Household has low income (  80% state median) 29621 0.218 0.413 0 1 
 moderate income 29621 0.170 0.376 0 1 
 high income (  120% state median)  29621 0.612 0.487 0 1 
Age of household head 29621 45.08 13.46 18 96 
Married 29621 0.621 0.485 0 1 
One child 29621 0.173 0.379 0 1 
Two children 29621 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Three or more children 29621 0.0863 0.281 0 1 
Head in labor force and unemployed last year 29621 0.0764 0.266 0 1 
Wife in labor force and unemployed last year 29621 0.0276 0.164 0 1 
Share units in tract that are single family 29621 0.617 0.279 0 1 
Share units in tract in apartment b. (5+ units) 29621 0.194 0.225 0 1 
Total net wealth in 2007 US-$1 million 29621 0.353 1.27 -1.30 50.48 
Year of observation 29621 1994.2 6.94 1984 2007 
Regulatory index compiled by Saks (2008) 29621 0.191 0.985 -2.40 2.21 
Property tax subsidy rate 29621 0.254 0.0419 0.161 0.501 
Effective mortgage interest rate 29621 0.0836 0.0187 0.0543 0.132 
House price appreciation rate (only years w/o move) 29621 0.0363 0.0474 -0.174 0.276 
Av. annual rent in MSA/region in 2007 US-$10,000 29621 0.698 0.161 0.351 1.34 
Additional income categories for robustness check:      
Household has income b/w 1.2-1.6   state median 29621 0.159 0.366 0 1 
  b/w 1.6-2.0   state median 29621 0.124 0.330 0 1 
   b/w 1.2-2.0   state median 29621 0.284 0.451 0 1 
  > 2.0   state median 29621 0.270 0.444 0 1 
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TABLE 3 
Sources of Variation in Mortgage Subsidy Rate 
 
PANEL A 
Full sample (regression sample for Table 4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 No change 
in MSR 
Any change in 
MSR 
Change in  
MSR >1% 
Change in 
MSR>3% 
Change in 
MSR>5% 
  # obs. in % # obs. in % # obs. in % # obs. in % # obs. in % 
No move across tract  305 88.9 40,712 81.6 11,336 76.7 3,317 72.7 145 39.0 
Moves across tract within 
state  
36 10.5 7,653 15.3 2,289 15.5 670 14.7 21 5.7 
Across state moves 2 0.6 1,508 3.0 1,157 7.8 576 12.6 206 55.4 
Total number of obs. 343 100 49,873 100 14,782 100 4,563 100 372 100 
 
PANEL B 
Sample with information on regulatory restrictiveness (Table 5) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
No change 
in MSR 
Any change in 
MSR 
Change in 
MSR >1% 
Change in 
MSR>3% 
Change in 
MSR>5% 
  # obs. in % # obs. in % # obs. in % # obs. in % # obs. in % 
No move across tract  124 88.6 22,051 80.2 6,046 74.5 1,765 70.3 105 41.8 
Moves across tract within 
state 
14 10.0 4,597 16.7 1,401 17.3 398 15.9 17 6.8 
Across state moves 2 1.4 859 3.1 664 8.2 348 13.9 129 51.4 
Total number of obs. 140 100 27,507 100 8,111 100 2,511 100 251 100 
Notes: We use 1980 Census tract indicators to identify whether households moved in any particular year or not. A 
household is identified as a mover-household if a change in the Census tract occurs. It is identified as an across-state 
mover if the state identifier changes as well. We cannot categorize moves that occur within tract and hence the above 
statistics slightly underrepresents the fraction of within-state moves. The probability that a household moves tract 
from one PSID period to the next is 18.3 percent in the full regression sample and 19.8 percent in the sample with 
information on regulatory restrictiveness. The total number of observations reported in this table differs from the 
regression samples as this table considers changes in the mortgage subsidy rate (MSR) from one year to the next for 
all observations in the regression sample with available information. The full regression sample consists of 53,279 
observations. We do not compute changes in the MSR for the 2,342 observations in 1984 as 1983 is not in our 
regression sample. For a further 721 observations no Census tract information is available for the previous year, 
resulting in a total of 50,216 (=343+49,873) observations in Table 3, Panel A. The regression sample used in Table 5 
consists of 29,621 observations; of these 1505 are for 1984. A further 469 observations do not have Census tract 
information for the previous year, resulting in a total of 27,647 (=140+27507) observations in Table 3, Panel B. 
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TABLE 4 
Baseline Specifications: Do Tax Subsidies Increase Homeownership Attainment? 
 
 Dependent variable: household is owner-occupier 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Household 
controls only 
Add location 
controls 
Add  
year-FE 
Add state   
time-trends 
Add MSA   
time-trends 
MSR varies by 
income group 
Mortgage subsidy rate 
(MSR) 
-0.128 -0.0453 -0.223 -0.0882 -0.0455  
(0.130) (0.112) (0.390) (0.368) (0.361)  
Low income 
MSR  
     -0.245 
     (0.382) 
Moderate income 
  MSR 
     -0.172 
     (0.384) 
High income  
MSR 
     0.0420 
     (0.380) 
Moderate income 
 
0.0781*** 0.0780*** 0.0784*** 0.0785*** 0.0772*** 0.0585 
(0.00942) (0.00908) (0.00906) (0.00894) (0.00871) (0.0649) 
High income 
 
0.142*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.0631 
(0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.00989) (0.0642) 
Total net wealth 0.00542** 0.00446** 0.00453** 0.00486** 0.00435** 0.00443** 
(0.00228) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00201) (0.00179) (0.00179) 
Age of head 0.0347*** 0.0313*** 0.0310*** 0.0313*** 0.0305*** 0.0305*** 
(0.00184) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00178) (0.00178) 
Age of head squared -0.000254*** -0.000227*** -0.000226*** -0.000228*** -0.000219*** -0.000220*** 
(1.89e-05) (1.77e-05) (1.81e-05) (1.82e-05) (1.86e-05) (1.86e-05) 
Married 0.196*** 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 
(0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
One child 0.0572*** 0.0513*** 0.0518*** 0.0535*** 0.0534*** 0.0529*** 
(0.00786) (0.00736) (0.00731) (0.00727) (0.00711) (0.00714) 
Two children 0.0973*** 0.0865*** 0.0867*** 0.0888*** 0.0901*** 0.0895*** 
(0.00903) (0.00857) (0.00857) (0.00855) (0.00830) (0.00833) 
Three or more children 0.125*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
(0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
Head unemployed -0.0427*** -0.0401*** -0.0396*** -0.0400*** -0.0401*** -0.0397*** 
(0.00757) (0.00721) (0.00716) (0.00707) (0.00703) (0.00701) 
Wife unemployed -0.0359*** -0.0349*** -0.0344*** -0.0339*** -0.0319*** -0.0318*** 
(0.0106) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.00996) (0.00997) 
Share of units that are 
single-family 
 0.0894** 0.0891** 0.0977** 0.0984** 0.0984** 
 (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0417) (0.0413) (0.0413) 
Share of units that are 
in 5+ unit-buildings 
 -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.304*** -0.308*** -0.308*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0513) (0.0507) (0.0506) (0.0506) 
Household FEs & const.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends No No No Yes Yes Yes 
MSA   time-trends No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 53279 53279 53279 53279 53279 53279 
Number of households 4197 4197 4197 4197 4197 4197 
Centered R-squared 0.221 0.288 0.288 0.294 0.315 0.315 
Uncentered R-squared 0.221 0.288 0.288 0.294 0.315 0.315 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on households 
and state year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 5 
Results for Specifications with Interaction ‘Tax Subsidy   Regulatory Restrictiveness’ 
 
 Dependent variable: household is owner-occupier 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 No State   
time-trends 
With state 
  time-
trends 
And with  
MSA time-
trends 
Spec. (2)  
but    
income 
group 
Spec. (3) 
but    
income 
group 
Spec. (3) 
but with  
state   
HH FEs  
Spec. (5) 
but with  
state   
HH FEs 
Mortgage subsidy rate 
(MSR) 
0.101 0.0531 0.100   -0.00603  
(0.515) (0.452) (0.452)   (0.457)  
Mortgage subsidy rate 
regulatory index 
-0.329*** -0.485*** -0.457***   -0.472***  
(0.127) (0.143) (0.156)   (0.157)  
Regulatory index -0.00572 0.0384 0.0379   0.216  
(0.0711) (0.0736) (0.0874)   (0.147)  
Low income MSR    -0.106 -0.0281  -0.282 
   (0.486) (0.485)  (0.489) 
Low income MSR 
regulatory index 
   0.149 0.177  0.136 
   (0.290) (0.288)  (0.294) 
Low income   
regulatory index 
   -0.114 -0.118  0.0584 
   (0.0942) (0.103)  (0.164) 
Moderate income MSR    -0.0720 -0.0424  -0.244 
   (0.503) (0.501)  (0.510) 
Moderate income MSR 
 regulatory index 
   -0.544* -0.507*  -0.527* 
   (0.300) (0.297)  (0.303) 
Moderate income   
regulatory index 
   0.0564 0.0503  0.223 
   (0.0995) (0.106)  (0.163) 
High income MSR    0.195 0.237  0.192 
   (0.468) (0.467)  (0.474) 
High income MSR 
regulatory index 
   -0.619*** -0.589***  -0.601*** 
   (0.164) (0.180)  (0.180) 
High income   
regulatory index 
   0.0744 0.0712  0.238 
   (0.0789) (0.0936)  (0.153) 
Moderate income 
 
0.0577*** 0.0563*** 0.0583*** 0.0515 0.0659 0.0569*** 0.0508 
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0868) (0.0874) (0.0130) (0.0905) 
High income 
 
0.139*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.0631 0.0738 0.136*** 0.0171 
(0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0852) (0.0861) (0.0152) (0.0902) 
Total net wealth 0.00352* 0.00385* 0.00371* 0.00393* 0.00379* 0.00324 0.00333 
(0.00197) (0.00202) (0.00194) (0.00205) (0.00197) (0.00220) (0.00222) 
Demographics/employment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing composition contr. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household FEs & const. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA   time-trends No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State  household FEs No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29621 29621 29621 29621 29621 29621 29621 
Number of households 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 
Centered R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.245 0.249 0.246 0.228 0.229 
Uncentered R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.245 0.249 0.246 0.228 0.229 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on households 
and state year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE 6 
Quantitative Effects 
 
PANEL A 
Specification 
Implied overall impact of MID on homeownership attainment  
(in percentage points) using 0.5 threshold 
Rent  Own No change Own  Rent Net impact 
Table 4 (1) 0.0 97.3 2.7 -2.7 
Table 4 (2) 0.0 98.9 1.1 -1.1 
Table 4 (3) 0.0 94.9 5.1 -5.1 
Table 4 (4) 0.0 97.9 2.1 -2.1 
Table 4 (5) 0.0 98.9 1.1 -1.1 
Table 4 (6) 0.3 96.2 3.5 -3.2 
Table 5 (1) 5.0 92.2 2.8 +2.2 
Table 5 (2) 6.0 89.2 4.8 +1.2 
Table 5 (3) 6.4 89.6 4.0 +2.4 
Table 5 (4) 5.9 89.9 4.2 +1.7 
Table 5 (5) 6.6 90.0 3.4 +3.2 
Table 5 (6) 2.6 94.6 2.8 -0.2 
Table 5 (7) 3.4 93.9 2.7 +0.7 
PANEL B 
 Implied average change in propensity to own due to introduction of mortgage interest 
deduction of 26 percent (= sample average) 
Specification Income Level 
Highly regulated  
(average regulatory 
index of MSAs with 
index at least 1 std. 
dev. above mean) 
(av. index: +1.59) 
Little regulated  
(average regulatory 
index of MSAs with 
index at least 1 std. 
dev. below mean) 
(av. index: -1.40) 
Table 5 (4) 
Low Not stat. sign. Not stat. sign. 
Moderate -24.3% +17.9% 
High -20.5% +27.6% 
Table 5 (5) 
Low Not stat. sign. Not stat. sign. 
Moderate -22.0% +17.4% 
High -18.1% +27.6% 
Table 5 (7) 
Low Not stat. sign. Not stat. sign. 
Moderate -28.1% +12.9% 
High -19.8% +26.9% 
Note: Quantitative effects in italics reported in Panel A are based on statistically insignificant coefficients. 
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FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 
Net State NBER SOI Mortgage Subsidy Rate by U.S. State in %, 1984-2007 
Notes: The series are the NBER SOI average net state mortgage subsidy rate (MSR) in each state and year and show 
the state-level mortgage interest subsidy rate. The series are generated based on a large, fixed, representative sample 
of U.S. taxpayers (the income distribution is held fixed), and only vary due to changes in federal and state tax laws 
that affect specifically state-level income tax structure. States not pictured do not have a state-level MSR during the 
time period considered. All graphs are normalized to a range of 5 percentage points, except Oklahoma, which has a 
range from 0 to 7 percentage points. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1 
Stylized Example: Simulated Effect of Implementing Mortgage Interest Deduction  
on Discounted Net Present Value of Homeownership 
N 
(years) 
 NPV due to implementation of MSR of 26% 
Pre-subsidy house price = $200K Pre-subsidy house price = $600K 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fairly elastic 
supply; 
extensive 
margin only 
Perfectly 
inelastic supply; 
extensive 
margin only 
Perfectly 
inelastic 
supply; full 
capitalization  
Fairly elastic 
supply; 
extensive 
margin only 
Perfectly 
inelastic supply; 
extensive 
margin only 
Perfectly 
inelastic 
supply; full 
capitalization 
 
         
=$18,181 
         
=$43,628 
         
=$51,942 
         
=$54,543 
         
=$130,884 
         
=$155,827 
1 -324 -5005 -6336 84 -14546 -19012 
2 2187 -3038 -4357 8632 -8197 -13075 
3 4556 -1246 -2570 16713 -2389 -7716 
4 6789 381 -967 24343 2903 -2905 
5 8889 1850 464 31536 7707 1388 
6 10862 3171 1732 38308 12047 5191 
7 12712 4350 2845 44671 15946 8531 
8 14442 5396 3813 50638 19427 11435 
9 16057 6316 4644 56221 22513 13928 
10 17560 7116 5346 61432 25223 16034 
Notes. This stylized example simulates the value of equation (2) and suggests that a discouraging incentive effect can 
arise when a MID is implemented. We report the simulated change in NPV (= NPV) as the result of the implementation 
of a MID of 26% (the sample average) for different holding periods (in years) and two different house purchase prices: 
Columns (1) to (3) report  NPV for a house with initial purchase price of $200,000, whereas columns (4) to (6) report 
     for a house with initial purchase price of $600,000. Following Glaeser et al. (2010), we assume a nominal 
mortgage interest rate, market interest rate and discount rate each equal to 7.2%, an inflation rate of 3.2%, a marginal tax 
rate of 25% and an initial LTV of 80%. We set the MSR equal to the sample average of 26%. We assume a nominal 
house price appreciation rate equal to 5% and a property tax rate and depreciation rate each equal to 2%. We set 
transaction costs at the time of sale to 10% of house values, which is consistent with the range of estimates reported in 
Haurin and Gill (2002). House price changes pertaining to demand on the extensive margin are computed using the 
parameter values and equilibrium price equation derived by Glaeser et al. (2010) (equation 7, p. 17) for fairly elastic and 
perfectly inelastic housing supply with the housing supply elasticity set equal to 2 and 0, respectively. The respective 
     are reported in columns (1) and (2) and (4) and (5), respectively. The remaining columns (3) and (6) assume full 
capitalization of the subsidy: a $200,000 house purchase price computed over a 20 year horizon generates a discounted 
NPV of the MID equal to $51,942, and a $600,000 house purchase price generates a discounted NPV of the MID equal to 
$155,827. Loan amounts are re-amortized assuming the household has a fixed level of savings available for a down 
payment, equal to 20% of the pre-subsidy purchase price, and letting the LTV rise. In other words, the increase in the 
market price due to the subsidy is rolled into the post-subsidy loan amount and generates a higher post-subsidy LTV of 
84.6%. Bold ∆NPV highlight negative values. 
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TABLE A2 
Are Tax Subsidies Capitalized to a Greater Extent in More Regulated Locations? 
 
 PANEL A 
Dependent variable:  
Log(house price index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Highly regulated 
 
(at least one 
standard deviation 
above mean) 
Little regulated 
 
(at least one  
standard deviation 
below mean) 
Highly regulated 
 
(at least one standard 
deviation above 
mean) 
Little regulated 
 
(at least one  
standard deviation 
below mean) 
Mortgage subsidy rate 4.622* 1.078 4.622* 1.101 
(2.105) (2.239) (2.132) (2.274) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA   time-trends No No Yes Yes 
Observations 312 352 312 352 
Number of MSAs 13 15 13 15 
R-squared overall  0.785 0.623 0.777 0.571 
R-squared within 0.963 0.944 0.968 0.953 
R-squared between 0.394 0.218 0.330 0.421 
 PANEL B 
Dependent variable:  
House price appreciation rate 
Percent change in 
mortgage subsidy rate 
0.640* 0.0522 0.640* 0.0522 
(0.252) (0.0682) (0.255) (0.0688) 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA   time-trends No No Yes Yes 
Observations 299 337 299 337 
Number of MSAs 13 15 13 15 
R-squared overall  0.643 0.0322 0.619 0.0316 
R-squared within 0.653 0.312 0.660 0.326 
R-squared between 0.221 0.250 0.00880 0.263 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on 
state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A3 
Table 5 but with User Cost Controls 
 
 Dependent variable: household is owner-occupier 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 No State   
time-trends 
With state 
  time-
trends 
And with  
MSA time-
trends 
Spec. (2)  
but    
income gr.  
Spec. (3) 
but    
income gr.  
Spec. (3) with 
state  
HH FEs  
Spec. (5) with 
state  
HH FEs 
Mortgage subsidy rate 
(MSR) 
0.0702 -0.604 -0.553   -0.699  
(0.704) (0.590) (0.593)   (0.609)  
Mortgage subsidy rate 
regulatory index 
-0.325** -0.499*** -0.475***   -0.495***  
(0.130) (0.146) (0.159)   (0.160)  
Regulatory index -0.00886 0.0383 0.0458   0.219  
(0.0716) (0.0744) (0.0879)   (0.146)  
Low income MSR    -0.772 -0.688  -0.987 
   (0.614) (0.617)  (0.628) 
Low income MSR 
regulatory index 
   0.141 0.162  0.118 
   (0.291) (0.288)  (0.293) 
Low income   
regulatory index 
   -0.116 -0.110  0.0606 
   (0.0947) (0.103)  (0.162) 
Moderate income MSR    -0.740 -0.708  -0.956 
   (0.636) (0.639)  (0.655) 
Moderate income MSR 
 regulatory index 
   -0.556* -0.513*  -0.539* 
   (0.300) (0.298)  (0.304) 
Moderate income   
regulatory index 
   0.0556 0.0556  0.224 
   (0.0998) (0.107)  (0.162) 
High income MSR    -0.468 -0.424  -0.515 
   (0.599) (0.602)  (0.620) 
High income MSR 
regulatory index 
   -0.637*** -0.613***  -0.630*** 
   (0.166) (0.182)  (0.183) 
High income   
regulatory index 
   0.0753 0.0810  0.243 
   (0.0796) (0.0939)  (0.152) 
Moderate income 
 
0.0576*** 0.0563*** 0.0582*** 0.0521 0.0673 0.0568*** 0.0524 
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0865) (0.0871) (0.0130) (0.0901) 
High income 
 
0.139*** 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.0622 0.0742 0.136*** 0.0172 
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0850) (0.0860) (0.0152) (0.0900) 
Total net wealth 0.00357* 0.00384* 0.00375* 0.00392* 0.00383* 0.00329 0.00338 
(0.00196) (0.00201) (0.00193) (0.00203) (0.00196) (0.00219) (0.00220) 
Property tax subsidy rate 0.0158 0.422 0.414 0.426 0.419 0.440 0.450* 
 (0.268) (0.260) (0.260) (0.259) (0.259) (0.268) (0.266) 
Effective mortgage  
Interest rate 
0.0737 0.440 -0.626 0.505 -0.562 -0.400 -0.344 
(0.902) (1.098) (1.088) (1.101) (1.089) (1.099) (1.103) 
House price appreciation  
rate in MSA or state 
-0.0144 0.0261 0.0400 0.0246 0.0383 0.0231 0.0206 
(0.0614) (0.0618) (0.0612) (0.0616) (0.0611) (0.0623) (0.0622) 
Av. annual rent in MSA  
or region in 10k dollar 
0.0527 0.108* 0.105* 0.111* 0.108* 0.108* 0.110* 
(0.0616) (0.0628) (0.0609) (0.0628) (0.0610) (0.0616) (0.0617) 
Other controls as in Table 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State   time-trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA   time-trends No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State  household FEs No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29621 29621 29621 29621 29621 29621 29621 
Number of households 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 2620 
Centered R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.246 0.249 0.246 0.228 0.229 
Uncentered R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.246 0.249 0.246 0.228 0.229 
 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on households and 
state year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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TABLE A4 (N=29,621) 
Robustness Checks: Remove Housing Composition Controls/Add More Income Categories  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Low income MSR 0.117 -0.0481 0.0925 -0.0506 0.0877 
(0.495) (0.483) (0.492) (0.481) (0.490) 
Low income MSR  
   regulatory index 
0.254 0.173 0.250 0.173 0.251 
(0.284) (0.288) (0.284) (0.289) (0.285) 
Low income  
 regulatory index 
-0.204** -0.119 -0.205** -0.119 -0.205** 
(0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Moderate income MSR 0.142 -0.0740 0.104 -0.0844 0.0906 
(0.510) (0.501) (0.510) (0.500) (0.508) 
Moderate income MSR  
  regulatory index 
-0.474 -0.505* -0.471 -0.497 -0.460 
(0.302) (0.302) (0.307) (0.303) (0.309) 
Moderate income  
  regulatory index 
-0.0276 0.0469 -0.0312 0.0454 -0.0337 
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
High income MSR 0.320     
 (0.472)     
High income MSR -0.605***     
  regulatory index (0.177)     
High income 0.00909     
  regulatory index (0.0914)     
Income b/w 1.2-1.6 times state median  
  MSR 
   0.165 0.187 
   (0.474) (0.479) 
Income b/w 1.2-1.6 times state median  
  MSR   regulatory index 
   -0.576** -0.538** 
   (0.251) (0.248) 
Income b/w 1.2-1.6 times state median 
    regulatory index 
   0.0660 -0.0116 
   (0.103) (0.101) 
Income b/w 1.6-2.0 times state median 
  MSR 
   0.123 0.218 
   (0.501) (0.510) 
Income b/w 1.6-2.0 times state median  
  MSR   regulatory index 
   -0.721*** -0.814*** 
   (0.277) (0.280) 
Income b/w 1.6-2.0 times state median 
  regulatory index 
   0.0956 0.0535 
   (0.110) (0.110) 
Income b/w 1.2-2.0 times state median  
   MSR 
 0.144 0.202   
 (0.468) (0.474)   
Income b/w 1.2-2.0 times state median  
MSR   regulatory index 
 -0.631*** -0.652***   
 (0.226) (0.224)   
Income b/w 1.2-2.0 times state median  
 regulatory index 
 0.0762 0.0148   
 (0.0995) (0.0980)   
Income > 2.0 times state median  
 MSR 
 0.334 0.447 0.331 0.444 
 (0.501) (0.507) (0.501) (0.506) 
Income > 2.0 times state median  
 MSR   regulatory index 
 -0.575*** -0.594*** -0.581*** -0.602*** 
 (0.203) (0.209) (0.204) (0.209) 
Income > 2.0 times state median  
  regulatory index 
 0.0704 0.00973 0.0717 0.0112 
 (0.0967) (0.0951) (0.0965) (0.0948) 
Moderate income 0.0541 0.0696 0.0587 0.0719 0.0611 
(0.0900) (0.0876) (0.0903) (0.0877) (0.0903) 
High income 0.0948     
 (0.0870)     
Income b/w 1.2-1.6 times state median    0.0768 0.111 
   (0.0966) (0.0982) 
Income b/w 1.6-2.0 times state median    0.106 0.120 
   (0.101) (0.102) 
Income b/w 1.2-2.0 times state median  0.0894 0.114   
  (0.0912) (0.0925)   
Income > 2.0 times state median  0.0602 0.0771 0.0640 0.0804 
 (0.0929) (0.0939) (0.0932) (0.0942) 
Controls as in Table 5, column(5) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing composition controls No Yes No Yes No 
Centered and uncentered R-squared 0.217 0.247 0.218 0.247 0.218 
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TABLE A5 
Population Weighted Summary Statistics: MSA-Level Aggregates 1984 to 2007 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Share owner-occupiers 1143 0.625 0.172 0 1 
Mortgage subsidy rate 1143 0.258 0.0284 0.194 0.342 
Regulatory index (Saks) 1143 0.159 1.09 -2.40 2.21 
Share low income 1143 0.257 0.134 0 1 
Share moderate income 1143 0.179 0.110 0 1 
Share high income 1143 0.564 0.156 0 1 
Average total net wealth 1143 0.246 0.364 -0.150 7.78 
Average age of household head 1143 42.9 5.75 21 82 
Share married 1143 0.614 0.160 0 1 
Share of HHs with one child 1143 0.195 0.110 0 1 
Share of HHs with two children 1143 0.207 0.114 0 1 
Share of HHs with 3+ children 1143 0.124 0.103 0 1 
Share of HH heads unemployed 1143 0.0951 0.0872 0 1 
Share of wives unemployed 1143 0.0298 0.0474 0 1 
Share of units that are single family 1143 0.591 0.149 0.0646 0.984 
Share of units in apartment buildings 1143 0.199 0.122 0 0.646 
Notes: Summary statistics include only MSAs that do not cross state borders. MSAs are weighted by the sum of the PSID 
individual weights. 
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TABLE A6 
Core Specifications using Weighted PSID Aggregates at MSA-Level 
 
 Dependent variable: homeownership rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Interaction 
MSR x reg. 
w. housing 
comp. contr. 
Interaction 
MSR x reg. 
w/o housing 
comp. contr. 
Income 
interactions 
w. housing 
comp. contr. 
Income 
interactions 
w/o housing 
comp. contr. 
Mortgage subsidy rate (MSR) 0.461 0.344   
(0.834) (0.835)   
Mortgage subsidy rate  regulatory index -0.450*** -0.447***   
(0.117) (0.146)   
Share low income MSR   0.742 0.617 
  (1.304) (1.382) 
Share low income MSR  regulatory index   0.940 0.745 
  (0.814) (0.837) 
Share moderate income MSR   0.996 0.215 
  (1.314) (1.445) 
Share moderate income MSR  regulatory index   -1.728* -1.969* 
  (0.960) (1.020) 
Share moderate income  regulatory index   0.677* 0.689* 
  (0.377) (0.381) 
Share high income MSR   0.424 0.327 
  (0.933) (0.928) 
Share high income MSR  regulatory index   -0.537* -0.444 
  (0.313) (0.347) 
Share high income  regulatory index   0.340 0.267 
  (0.289) (0.301) 
Share moderate income 
 
0.111*** 0.122*** 0.0445 0.225 
(0.0258) (0.0345) (0.343) (0.328) 
Share high income 
 
0.263*** 0.288*** 0.349 0.367 
(0.0411) (0.0306) (0.353) (0.367) 
Average total net wealth 0.0294* 0.0114 0.0304* 0.0121 
(0.0164) (0.0183) (0.0156) (0.0175) 
Demographics/employment Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Housing composition controls Yes No Yes No 
MSA FEs & const. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143 
Number of MSAs 66 66 66 66 
R-squared overall model 0.308 0.265 0.109 0.0967 
R-squared within model 0.422 0.385 0.426 0.389 
R-squared between model 0.292 0.301 0.0538 0.0692 
Notes: Regression includes only MSAs that do not cross state borders. MSAs are weighted by the sum of the PSID 
individual weights. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustering on state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  
 
 
